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 Despite their importance to our system, the study of interest groups has produced few 
concrete findings compared to other actors such as administrative agencies and political parties 
in the policymaking process.  The absence of generalizable findings is partly explained by the 
unpopularity of the topic, but is primarily due to a deficiency of easily accessible data and lack of 
agreement over how to operationalize important concepts.  In the following dissertation, I 
employ interest group “scorecards” (ratings of members of Congress) as an approach to 
examining interest groups in a generalizable manner.  Specifically, I use scorecards to test the 
pluralist assumptions of public policy reflecting an equilibrium of competing interests.  I do this 
by developing a measure of legislative satisfaction, which can be compared across different types 
of groups and congresses.  I examine four types of organizations – business and professional 
trade associations, labor unions, charitable organizations, and public interest groups – which 
issued senate scorecards from the 106
th
 through the 111
th
 congresses.  I find that the satisfaction 
of labor and charitable groups fluctuates with changes in the partisan makeup of the senate, but 
business satisfaction remains relatively constant and high for most terms of Congress.  As 
expected, public interest satisfaction remains constant but low.  The typical layperson may 
assume that groups with popular missions (those representing large populations) and lots of 
money or those who spend considerable amounts on political activities (e.g., campaigning and 
lobbying) may be more satisfied with Congress.  However, this study finds no relationship 
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 Generations of pluralist scholars have noted the uniqueness of the American political system 
in that it maximizes outlets for interests to be heard in the policy process (Sayre and Kaufman 1960; 
Dahl 1961; Merelman 1968; Kelso 1978; Martin 1982).  Citizens can donate their time and money to 
candidates; take part in public meetings; comment during the administrative rulemaking process; 
organize a ballot measure; and, if all else fails, file a lawsuit forcing a government agency to take 
action or preventing it from doing so.  Of course, being heard by decision making bodies does not 
necessarily mean that one gets what he or she wants when the ultimate policy decisions are made.  
To be truly effective at shaping policy, citizens must use what Truman described in The 
Governmental Process (1951) as “group politics,” where individuals of shared interests pull together 
for a common policy goal.  Although there were certainly studies that referenced political groups 
prior to Truman’s
1
 – his thesis was nothing less than “monumental” (Crotty 1994, 1).  Today, it is 
correctly recognized for kick-starting the academic study of interest groups (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998, 3; Ainsworth 2002, 11).  Truman (1951, 505) noted that interest groups are a natural 
outgrowth of two conditions: (1) shared attitudes over problems and (2) claims over others “through 
or upon the institutions of government.”  In the long-running pluralists vs. elitists debate on who 
wields power over policy decision makers (Hunter 1953; Dahl 1961), Truman’s discussion of group 
politics became an integral component of the pluralists argument that policy decisions represent an 
equilibrium reached in a struggle among competing “interest groups” (e.g., Johnson 1962; Baskin 
1970; Denzau and Munger 1986).  Interest group pluralism soon became the dominant explanation 
for policymaking among political scientists and remains so to this day, although scholars have 
proposed slightly altered iterations of the theory (e.g., Lowi 1964, 678; Kelso 1978; Jordan 1990).   
                                                          
1






 Truman’s work, invaluable as it was, nonetheless contained a number of logical flaws.  In the 
1950s and early 1960s, most studies to mention interest groups described what they did as opposed 
to examining their internal workings (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 64).  Pluralists simply accepted 
Truman’s theory of how groups developed.  Still, it seemed that a number of sectors of society could 
rightly claim grievances and try to petition government.  If groups naturally formed around shared 
interests in response to disturbances, then why were there so few groups representing the most 
“disturbed” populations (e.g., the poor and ethnic minorities), especially when compared the number 
of business and industry organizations (Ainsworth 2002, 11).  The question was answered with 
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1965), arguably the most important contribution to the study of 
interest groups.
2
  Olson demonstrated that not all potential groups (those with shared interest and 
claims over others) are equally likely to develop.  There were two types of goals, or goods, that 
potential groups try to pursue: private and public.  Those advocating for private, or excludable, 
goods enjoyed a mobilization advantage.  Those advocating for public goods (e.g., clean air, 
government accountability), had to overcome the free rider problem, when individuals realize they 
can benefit from a good without contributing to the effort to obtain it.  
 Inspired by Truman and Olson, a number of scholars took up the cause of determining how 
groups respond to disturbances and overcome the free rider problem (e.g., Clark and Wilson 1961; 
Salisbury 1969; Wilson 1973; Moe 1980a; Moe 1980b; Walker 1983; Salisbury 1984; Hansen 1985; 
Rothenberg 1988).  As a result, questions on how groups form were largely answered (Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998; Ainsworth 2002, 10-64).  Shared interests alone are not enough to foment creation 
of an interest group, and instead, mobilization often requires incentives.  In some cases it requires 
entrepreneurial leadership (Salisbury 1969).  Most importantly, this research has shown that the 
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nation’s interest group population should never be mistaken as an aggregation of society’s collective 
interests.  It seemed that some sectors of society always enjoyed a mobilization advantage when it 
comes to participation in group politics.   
 Sadly, after thoroughly explaining how groups form, scholarly interest in interest groups 
quickly waned.  Having answered the easier questions around group formation and providing 
descriptions of the interest group population, academics seemed confused at how to confront the 
more difficult topics of how groups worked to shape public policy.  There were no academic 
journals dedicated to interest groups.
3
  While topics such as the presidency, Congress, and elections 
were over-studied by some accounts, interest groups had remained relatively unexplored (Arnold 
1982).  Studies of other subfields such as political parties and elections far outnumbered interest 
group studies by the early 1990s.  One count of political science and public policy dissertations 
revealed only that only 6 percent had any relevance to interest groups (Berry 1994, 21).   
 The decline in research productivity did not go unnoticed, of course.  Cigler (1991) divided 
studies of interest groups into two sets.  First were studies centering on group mobilization issues, 
e.g., the collective action problem; how leaders encourage and relate to membership; and surveys of 
the interest group population.  The second set dealt with group political activities, e.g., what groups 
did and its effect on policy.  Virtually all of academia’s solid findings, Cigler noted, came out of the 
first set of studies.   
 What explained the loss of attention to interest groups following the outpouring of excellent 
mobilization studies?  The lack of conclusive findings on the effects of interest group activities 
certainly was not attributable to a failure on the part of scholars to recognize the importance of them.  
Instead, the inactivity and few generalizations could primarily be blamed on one problem: data, or 
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more precisely, the lack thereof.  As a number of scholars would attest, interest group scholars 
lacked large, institutionally supported datasets that researchers examining other political science 
topics such as voting and elections enjoyed (Arnold 1982, 101; Cigler 1994; Berry 1994, 21-22; 
Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 4-5).  The one exception was research on political action committee 
(PAC) contributions, which enjoyed ready-to-analysis data provided by the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) in the wake of the 1971 and 1974 Federal Election Campaign Acts (FECA) 
(Arnold 1982, 101; Cigler 1994, 29-30; Berry 1994, 22; Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 5; Ainsworth 
2002, 188).  Scholars seeking to study anything interest group related other than PACs, however, 
faced considerable obstacles.  Other topics required traveling to the capital for interviews or mailing 
out costly surveys (Arnold 1992; Berry 1994).  As Cigler (1994) noted: “[D]ata availability has been 
the major determinant of the interest group politics research agenda, framing both the questions we 
explore and the topics we avoid… hard data are more the exception than the rule in the study of 
organized interests, a fact that has contributed to discouraging a number of political scientists from 
becoming interest group specialists” (Cigler 1994, 29-30). 
 This dearth of data has especially hampered studies of the relationship between interest 
group activity and the decisions of policy makers.  Of course we can accurately describe the interest 
group population, and we have some idea of what types of groups chose to engage in certain 
political activities.  We can say with some measure of confidence labor unions prefer to spend on 
campaigning, while business associations prefer lobbying (McKay 2010).  We can distinguish 
between which groups use grassroots tactics and those who use “astroturf” (Lyon and Maxwell 
2004).  But are groups that engage in these activities any more happy with the ultimate policy 
decisions?  On questions such as this, we are unsure.  Despite the long-running debate over power in 
the policy process that raged between pluralists and elitists from the 1950s to 1970s (e.g., Hunter 





get a clear – or even opaque – answer to the question: What sector of society was most likely to get 
what it wanted?  Indeed, it was not just the lack of quality data that produced contradictory findings; 
scholars could not even agree on how to go about collecting the data they could obtain.  Pluralist 
scholars in political science preferred the “decisional approach” to data collection, while elitist 
scholars, mostly in sociology, prefer a “reputational approach” (Merelman 1968, 451).  Most 
importantly, because of the tremendous investment of resources necessary to employ either the 
decisional or reputational approach, the power debates examined only single communities, which 
greatly limited generalizability even with clear findings (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 59).   
 Lack of data was intimately related to the other methodological problem confronting 
scholars: measuring influence.  No matter how scholars choose to track legislative decisions, they 
were never quite able to show that the interest group’s political activities led to a specific outcome 
(Smith 1995, 93-95).  Even PAC studies (the one activity on which data were available) suffered 
from endogeneity problems (Wawro 2001, 565).  The conflicting conclusions of past studies are 
evidence that “important conceptual issues apparently remain unresolved” (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998, 15). 
 In the absence of easily obtainable data and agreement on measurable concepts, most 
scholars have chosen to avoid studying the relationship between interest groups and policy decisions 
altogether (Berry 1997, 219; Mahoney 2007, 35).  Instead, they have moved on to other areas of 
research, such as voting and elections, “where conclusions could be better sustained” (Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998, 13).   
 This dissertation presents a new approach to examining the relationship between interest 
groups and policy decisions.  This approach, I argue, overcomes the challenges of obtaining quality 
data and the difficulty of measuring concepts such as influence.  In this study, I use interest group 





Scorecards are a way membership associations inform their members about a legislator’s level of 
support for the organization’s mission.  Groups can vary in their methods of evaluation and the time 
periods over which they generate their cards.  No matter what the evaluation method or time-period 
analyzed, however, groups have consistently used them over the last couple of decades.  While 
conducting this study, I was able to collect from one source nearly 680,000 legislator ratings issued 
by nearly 300 nonprofit membership organizations.
4
   
 The majority of umbrella associations that represent large sectors of the interest group 
society issue legislator ratings regularly.  Both the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO, 
for example, issued cards during each of the 12 years included in this study.  Since I use these 
ratings as a measure of groups’ satisfaction with Congress (much like an opinion poll measures 
presidential or congressional approval), I avoid the endogeneity complications that have plagued 
prior studies.  I do not contend that the group’s presence caused legislators to decide the way they 
did.  I simply demonstrate how satisfied the group was with members of Congress.   
 Academics have, of course, known of the existence of scorecards long before I conceived of 
this study.  Past studies have used cards in a number of ways.  The majority have used ratings as a 
proxy measure for legislator ideology or preference (e.g., Kingdon 1973; Markus 1974; Stratmann 
1996; Cohen et al. 2000). Some have used evaluations as measures for legislators’ level of support 
on policy areas such as the environment (Nelson 2002).  However, there is one constant of prior 
scorecard studies: virtually all have employed ratings as a means making inferences about 
legislators.
5
  Instead of using scorecards to study members of Congress, however, I use cards to 
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mainly have to do with time and are better discussed in the data collection portion of this 
dissertation.  Still, the sheer number of observations collected confirms my point that scorecards are 
a rich and abundant source of data for scholars interested in interest groups.   
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analysis the interest groups that created them.  By aggregating scorecards for entire Congresses, I 
develop a sense of how satisfied groups were with Congress from term-to-term and under different 
partisan majorities.  In this dissertation, I aggregate 105,893 individual legislator ratings of U.S. 
senators issued by 249 different organizations from the 106
th
 through the 111
th
 Congresses.  I study 
four types of nonprofit interest groups: (1) business and trade associations; (2) labor unions; (3) 
public interest organizations; (3) and charitable groups.  Other variables studied include the partisan 
makeup of the Senate, the degree to which groups lobby Congress, campaign expenditures, group 
financial resources, membership size, and a proxy measure for the wealth of the group’s 
membership.   
 A new approach to studying interest groups in a generalizable way is badly in need.  The 
interest group component, while most likely a valid addition to pluralist theory, potentially creates 
obstacles to maintaining a democratic system.  Interest groups seem to both “fascinate” and 
“frustrate” Americans precisely because they do not neatly fit within the democratic concept of 
majority rule (Ainsworth 2002, 4).  Majority rule, in at least the most basic setting, connotes an 
element of fairness (May 1952).  Determining whether the interest group system is truly democratic 
has required testing two assumptions of pluralism.  First, all interests must somehow be represented 
in the process, preferably in a rough proportion to their makeup in society (e.g., Schattschneider 
1960; Scholzman and Tierney 1986; Baumgartner and Leech 2001).  Second, public policy should, 
at least somewhat closely, reflect the population of organized interests (e.g., Mahoney 2007; 
Baumgartner et al 2009).  In other words, popular causes, barring they do not violate a fundamental 
right enshrined in the Constitution, should win over less popular ones.   
 Scholars have been able to test the first, and I would add least important, of these two 
assumptions.  One point on which virtually all scholars, pluralist and non-pluralist alike, should 





thing is a matter of much disagreement.  The post-Truman pluralists endorsed group politics with 
much enthusiasm, partly as an opportunity to focus on people and groups in politics, as opposed to 
the dry institutionalist studies of Congress, the presidency, and the courts (Ainsworth 2002, 4-5).  
Some pluralists, however, would cite Madison’s Federalist #10 in support of their contention that a 
large interest group population serves as a check on tyranny.  Such scholars embraced Truman’s 
arguments as more than simply a description of how the system worked but also how it should be.  
For these so-called “prescriptive pluralists” (e.g., Sayre and Kaufman 1960; Dahl 1961; Merelman 
1968; Wolfinger 1971) more groups meant more democracy (Kelso 1978, 41-47; Berry 1997, 3-4 
and 10-11; Ainsworth 2002, 6).  By expanding the population of competing “factions,” no organized 
interest would monopolize the process.  Even if a societal interest was unorganized, the pluralist 
defenders argued that a frequently ignored sector of society could always utilize its “political slack” 




 However, Olson’s (1965) “devastating Logic” dealt a blow to the pluralist assumption that all 
potential groups have an equal opportunity to mobilize and thus participate in the system 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 67).  Olson’s thesis could not eliminate the possibility that all 
potential groups are at least somewhat represented (a highly unlikely, although technically possible, 
prospect).  It did, however, show that some organizations, mainly small, business-oriented groups, 
retained a mobilizing advantage.   These groups would be overrepresented in the system; while 
interests seeking public goods may mobilize, they would never do so to their full potential.   
 Post-Truman scholars seem to have delivered a fatal blow to the first assumption of 
pluralism.  First, they convincingly showed that interest group members tend to be more wealthy and 
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educated than the typical American (Hyman and Wright 1971; Verba and Nie 1972).  Second, they 
have conclusively revealed that organized business are overly represented in the interest group 
society (e.g., Schattschneider 1960, 20- 46; Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 58-87; Baumgartner and 
Leech 2001; King and Walker 1991).   Taken together, all of the membership and mobilization 
studies largely proved that being disturbed alone is not enough to mobilize.   
 The overrepresentation of some interests, however, does not necessarily mean that those with 
the mobilization advantage are any more likely to get what they want.  Similarly, while some groups 
of interests are underrepresented, Olson’s logic does not preclude these groups from being 
represented at all.  In fact, Walker (1991, 41-48) noted that it was somewhat ironic Olson’s 
argument was published at the beginning of a growth period for groups representing public causes.   
 While scholars have sufficiently shown that pluralism fails at the first assumption, the 
absences of quality data and the methodological difficulties mentioned earlier have prevented them 
from properly addressing the second.  Pluralist scholars love to point out that there are ample 
opportunities for interest groups to voice their concerns to decision makers (e.g., Dahl 1951; 
Merelman 1968; Wolfinger 1971; Sabatier and Weible 2007).  And in their defense, while groups 
representing organized labor, public interests, and charitable causes may be in the minority, there is 
little scholarly evidence to indicate that policymakers are any less likely to agree with them than 
with business organizations.  The numeric advantage of business and trade associations in 
Washington is less troubling if legislators are no more likely to give support to their policy goals.  
As Ainsworth (2002, 4) remarks, “[i]f the basic notion of majority rule remained undisturbed by the 
presence or actions of interest groups, then few individuals would ever complain about groups.”  
Berry and Wilcox (2009, 4) further note that “the ideal of multiple groups that offset each other’s 






 During the pluralism heyday of the early to mid-1960s, the idea that any one small sector of 
society could consistently achieve policy success over other organized or potential interests was 
overwhelmingly rejected in political science (see for example Sayre and Kaufman 1960; Dahl 1961; 
Wolfinger 1963; Merelman 1968).  Dahl (1961, 145), the foremost proponent of prescriptive 
pluralism, argued that the American political process was one “in which there is a high probability 
that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some 
crucial stage in the process of decision.”  Thus, public policy was the product of a bargaining 
process between organized groups who were constantly aware that they could not overplay their 
hand, as doing so would cause potential interests to mobilize and serve as a counterbalance.  
Policymakers were merely the referees.  Furthermore, pluralists would point out that there are a 
number of issues about which organized business has no opinion (see the elites in Dahl’s 1961 
study).  Pluralists would presume that such issues are those where non-elite interests compete as 
equals.   
 The scholarly research on the mobilization of groups has without a doubt been valuable.  
Yet, the almost singular obsession of scholars to explain how groups mobilize and to describe the 
interest group population has caused us to lose sight of larger, more important questions 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 80-82).  The most important issue for researchers today is to 
determine who succeeds in the policy process (Ainsworth 2002, 1-8).   
 Yet, researchers have had considerable difficulty determining if the overrepresentation of 
organized business translates into more favorable policies.  While there are some studies to examine 
the relationship between business and public policy, the generalizability of past studies has been 





reasoning and case studies for their methodology.
7
  Additionally, most of these studies have not 
examined congressional policy, and very few have compared business activities to other organized 
interests.   
 I use interest group scorecards to test the second assumption of pluralism.  I theorize that 
business and professional trade associations will show the highest levels of satisfaction with 
legislators and those scores for these groups will be less susceptible to partisan changes in the 
Senate.  I also predict, based off previous literature of mobilization and the popularity of causes, that 
small but wealthy niche organizations will also show higher levels of satisfaction.  
 There are serious implications to any one sector of society consistently showing higher levels 
of satisfaction with public policy.  Pluralism only works properly if all interests come to the 
negotiating table with a roughly equal opportunity of having grievances satisfied.  In the next 
chapter, I provide an overview of the previous interest group literature, ending with a discussion of 
recent attempts to test the second assumption of pluralism.  In the preceding sections, I discuss how 
my methodology can determine if the mobilization advantage of private interests translates into a 
higher satisfaction with the legislative policy at the adoption stage.   
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II. INTEREST GROUPS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Introduction 
Interest groups enjoy a rather unique position in the policy process.  While an ever-present 
part of the political system, they hold no institutional or constitutionally recognized positions within 
government such as Congress, the courts, the executive branch, or administrative agencies.  Unlike 
political parties, their members hold no official policymaking positions.  Yet, as Madison’s 
Federalist #10 verifies, we have always anticipated interest groups playing some role in the creation 
of public policy.  They are without a doubt an important part of the system, as there is hardly an 
issue or area of policy with which interest groups are not involved (Berry 1997; Schlozman and Tierney 
1986; Walker 1991).  In many ways, groups help build social capital by bringing citizens together 
(Putnam 2001; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  They serve to aggregate citizen demands under 
one broad banner (Salisbury 1969, 6-7), and can articulate those collective interests to institutions of 
government on a continual basis (Easton 1965).  They are also important sources of policy information 
to their membership, government agencies, elected office, and the media (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998; Berry 1997; Likert 1961, 140-161; Pierce et al. 1992; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991).  
They even serve as implementers of some public policies, especially in the age of contracting out 
government services (Kettle and Fesler 2009, 68; Moynihan 2005; Ryan 1999; Salamon 2006; Smith 
and Lipski 1993).  
This chapter discusses the relevant interest group literature that applies to this study.  The 
following literature also covers some of the most of the popular topics within the field of interest group 
research.  The next section provides a brief review of the mobilization literature, followed by a 
discussion on the makeup of the American interest group population.  This is the most developed area 
of literature in interest group studies, and it has convincingly shown prescriptive pluralism assumptions 





discuss the literature on the “privileged position” of organized business, which is by far the most active 
sector of the interest group population.  The review of this literature reveals the ease at which scholars 
have demonstrated how active organized business is in the system and the difficulties experienced in 
determining whether business activity translates into policy success.  The most popular approach to 
analyzing interest groups and policy influence has been to study activities such as electioneering and 
lobbying.  I discuss the literature on both of these activities, starting with a brief explanation of the laws 
governing them and then discuss the literature on their policy impact.  While the literature on these 
activities is rich, the findings on their effects have been inconclusive.   
Mobilization and the Interest Group Population 
 Before we discuss studies of interest groups, it probably makes sense to first define what an 
“interest group” is.  While this may seem rather straight forward, there is not one universally 
accepted definition of the term within academia.  More narrow definitions have only included 
voluntary membership associations.  Yet, if we simply define an interest group as an organization 
seeking to influence public policy, then the majority of interest groups are actually institutions such 
as for-profit corporations
8
 (by far the most common institutional interest group), hospitals, and 
public and private universities (Salisbury 1984).  Even the University of Arkansas would qualify.
9
  
The majority of political scientists have used the more broad definition, opting to include institutions 
within their studies.  Using such a broad definition has its strengths, as it is becoming increasingly 
common for for-profit corporations to have individual lobbying campaigns in Washington, in 
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 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “for-profit corporations,” in reference to publicly 
traded businesses such as Wal-Mart.  Political science studies will simply refer to these as 
“corporations.” However, nonprofit associations (including all of the groups in my study) are also 
corporations in the legal sense of the word, and are also referred to as such in scholarly articles on 
nonprofit groups.   
9
 See University of Arkansas system’s yearly federal lobbying expenditures at the following link 
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addition to being represented by their trade associations (Berry 1994, 25; Cigler and Loomis 1998, 
10; Drutman 2012; Hudson 2009, 218).  My study only includes tax-exempt, membership 
associations, but my thesis concerns the policy satisfaction of organized business generally.  
Therefore, the following literature covers studies that use both types of definitions.   
 Whether you choose a broad or narrow definition of interest groups, the American political 
system without a doubt produces a lot of them (Ainsworth 2002, 3-4).  The Encyclopedia of 
Associations 40
th
 ed. reports that there more than 22,000 nonprofit trade and public affairs groups by 
2003 (Baumgartner 2005, 5).  A large and diverse population of interest groups was an intended 
outcome by the framers.  Madison predicted in the Federalist #10 that organized interests, or 
“factions,” would try to influence public policy.  His solution to power-hungry factions was to have 
opposing interests cancel each other out.   
 While the American interest group population is large, it is not particularly diverse.  And it is 
certainly not as diverse as the diversity of interest among the entire American population.  The 
primary explanation for the lack of diversity was provided by Olson (1965), who corrected 
Truman’s (1951) notion of individuals with shared interests naturally coming together to confront 
challenges in democratic societies.  Olson explained that when the benefits of coming together can 
be selectively awarded to members and active participants, groups will mobilize to their full 
potential.  But if the collective interest is a public good, many individuals will chose to “free ride” 
on the efforts of others.  Organizations seeking collective benefits that are not able to make 
membership compulsory (such as the state does) must therefore provide some non-collective benefit 
to create an incentive for potential members to join.  His theory also carries implications for group 
sizes.  If we chose to define groups or potential groups based on shared interests (which was 
common at the time) then logic dictates the following: Small groups in which only a small number 





group agreement, because the members receiving disproportionate benefits will be willing to incur a 
large amount, if not all, of the costs to see that it is provided.   
  While it is more difficult for citizens to mobilize around public causes, they often do.  In 
fact, a number of scholars following Olson set out to illustrate how groups of potential interest could 
overcome the collective action problem.  Olson focused on material selective benefits offered by 
groups, but authors soon pointed to other selective benefits that can produce collective action.  
Salisbury (1969) described how groups could mobilize through the work of a dynamic entrepreneur, 
who provided individuals with “expressive benefits,” the satisfaction one gests from being able to 
say he contributed to the cause.  Wilson (1973) noted that groups sometimes assemble based on 
“solidary benefits,” the potential to mingle with like-minded individuals.  He also provided the 
concept of “purposive incentives,” an appeal to the good feelings one gets from contributing to a 
cause that benefits society as a whole.
10
  Exogenous factors can also play a role.  Walker (1991) and 
Smith and Lipsky (1993) argued that the creation of public programs can spur the creation of 
charitable and public interest groups.  In an earlier study, Walker (1983, 398) found that 89 percent 
of groups advocating for public causes received some type of startup funding, e.g., grants from 
businesses or foundations.    
 While the mobilization literature is among the most well developed in political science, it is 
not without some areas of confusion.  Disagreements over what constitutes an interest group 
“member” have hampered the discipline’s attempts to completely understand why individuals join 
groups (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 30-31).  An occasionally un-clarified point is that not all 
“members” of an organization are individuals.  King and Walker’s (1991) surveys uncovered a 
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 The concepts of “expressive” and “purposive” benefits are sometimes confused, and some authors 
consider them to be the same.  A simple way to tell the difference is one experiences a purposive 
benefit when he feels good about contributing to the National Rifle Association.  He experiences an 





population of membership associations that is rather evenly divided between groups whose 
membership is composed of individuals (e.g., League of Women Voters) and those whose 
membership consists of institutions and businesses (e.g., United States Cane Sugar Refiners 
Association).  Groups in the latter, who represent for-profit interests, enjoy a number of mobilization 
advantages.  For instance, institutional memberships are easier to gather, and individual 
memberships in business and trade associations are often subsidized (p. 73).  Public interest groups 
also face greater competition for members because they must mobilize around broad issue areas, as 
opposed to the “niche” areas business groups often represent (p. 68).    
 Given the low likelihood of citizens to mobilize around most interests, it is little surprise that 
participation in interest groups is rather low.  Verba and Nie (1972, 42) place public participation in 
groups at 8 percent.  Since the 1970s, the percentage of Americans who report being members of 
“political clubs” to the General Social Survey (GSS) has remained in the single digits (Smith, 
Marshen, and Hout 2011, 545).
11
  Political activism levels have always been highly correlated with 
wealth and education; hence, it is no surprise that the typical interest group member has accumulated 
more wealth and education than most Americans (Hyman and Wright 1971; Verba and Nie 1972, 
31-41; Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 83-98).  The wealth and education participation bias is also 
true among young people (Jarvis, Montoya, and Mulvoy 2005).  In fact, it has been noted that a large 
percentage of overall group membership activities is actually generated by a surprisingly small 
population of wealthy and highly educated individuals who participate in a large number of groups 
(Baumgartner and Walker 1988, 919).   
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churches and PTAs, which can sometimes become political, are much higher.  I am referring to 
political groups, the types which have a permanent presence in Washington, D.C. and would issue 





 Past academic studies of the interest group population have varied in methods, but all have 
agreed that the population of organized groups does not represent society’s interests as a whole.  
Private interest organizations (chiefly for-profit corporations and business associations) enjoy a 
numeric advantage in the policymaking system.  The first attempts to develop a picture of the 
interest group population accompanied reform efforts during the progressive movement (Zeller 
1948, 239-40).  These early studies were counts of organized interests with a presence in 
Washington, D.C.  Herring (1929, 267-83), for example, who may have been the first scholar to 
study the issue, compiled lists of hundreds of organizations in Washington, revealing that most 
groups represented private interests.  Even Truman (1951, 58) later cited a survey of more than 
4,000 nationally politically active groups to show that the majority of groups represented business 
interests.  So prevalent were economic institutions in Washington that Truman worried about 
researchers committing the “error of treating economic groups as the only important interest groups” 
(p. 61).   
 Schattschneider (1960), in his discussion of the “scope and bias” of the pressure system, was 
the first to stress a needed distinction between public and private interests.  In an examination of 
lobbying reports from 1946 to 1949, he discovered that two-thirds of the more than 1,200 
organizations and individuals who filed reports represented businesses, leading him to famously 
quip that the “flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with an upper-class 
accent” (p. 31-5).  Schattschneider’s study notably differed from previous ones in that his population 
consisted only of politically active groups, i.e., those that lobby.  His focus on lobbying seems to 
have set the parameters for most future studies of the interest group population.   This was probably 
an appropriate method of operationalizing the concept of interest group.  As Berry and Arrons 
(2003, 27) note, “general rule of thumb among scholars is that if it lobbies, it’s an interest group.”  





 Schlozman and Tierney (1986, 77) found that more than 70 percent of groups represented by 
lobbyists in Washington were for-profit corporations, business associations, or professional trade 
associations like the American Medical Association (AMA).  Baumgartner and Leech (2001), 
examining more than 19,000 lobbying reports for 137 randomly selected issues from 1996, found 
that for-profit corporations and business and professional trade associations filed more lobbying 
reports than public interest and charitable groups (with 1,227 reports filed by the former and 157 by 
for the latter two groups).  The authors also established that for-profit businesses and business 
groups were more likely to hire lobbying firms than public interest and charitable groups, with 
business firms numbering 2,612 and 181 for the latter two.  Not only does business constitute the 
largest category of lobbying, but is “by far the best endowed and the most active” they conclude (p. 
1196). 
 Defining the interest group population based on groups that lobby as meant that the majority 
of scholars have incorporate non-membership associations into their studies.  King and Walker 
(1991) and Baumgartner (2005) stand out as notable exceptions who, similar to this study, only 
examined nonprofit, membership associations.  Using responses to surveys of 1,500 interest groups, 
King and Walker (1991, 57-74) found the majority of groups (76.1 percent) to be trade and 
professional associations.  They further note that most groups in Washington restrict membership to 
those possessing specific professional or trade credentials.  Consequently, the majority of groups 
advocate for non-public goals on behalf of an extremely narrow membership.  Baumgartner (2005) 
builds his population sample from editions of the Encyclopedia of Associations, which attempts to 
report on all voluntary organizations in the country.
12
  The majority of the nearly 5,000 
organizations recorded in the first edition of the Encyclopedia of Associations (1956) were business 
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and trade associations (Baumgartner 2005, 2-3).  While subsequent editions have recorded a growth 
in citizen groups,
13
 organizations representing business and for-profit trades still constitute the 
plurality or majority for all following years.   
 In all fairness, no method of categorizing interest groups can perfectly depict the shared 
political goals or cleavages within the interest group society.  The business community can be 
fractured on a number of issues (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 113; Baumgartner and Leech 2001; 
Barakso 2010; Smith 2000).  It is also worth noting that scholarly conclusions on how the population 
is changing have varied.  King and Walker (1991), for example, identify a growth in citizen groups 
starting in the 1960s as an indication that the business community will hold a smaller majority status 
in coming years.  Schlozman and Tierney (1986, 67-87), however, point to the increased lobbying of 
for-profit corporations as evidence that the numeric advantage of business interests will only 
increase.  Still, when compared to most topics in social sciences, the body of research that describes 
the American interest group population is noteworthy for its uncharacteristically high level of 
consistency across findings.  As Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 93) observe, the fact that individuals 
organize around professions and industries at much greater rates than shared cultural beliefs, ethnic 
backgrounds, or other potential causes, “makes clear that the constellation of interest groups active 
in the nation’s capital should never be assumed to mirror the set of interests in society.”  
“The Privileged Position of Business”  
 At no point in our nation’s history has government ever been free from wealthy business 
attempts to influence public policy.  Even the first federalist-dominated governments under the 
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 The majority of scholars have referred to all groups advocating for public causes, e.g., abortion 
rights or soup kitchens for the homeless, as “public interest groups” or “citizens groups.”  I make a 
distinction between “public interests,” which are ideological groups and those that focus the majority 
of their efforts on policy influence, and “charitable groups,” those who dedicate the majority of their 
resources toward social services.  To avoid confusion, I use the term “citizens groups” in reference 





Constitution were generously supported by merchants in the north east (Zardkoohi 1985, 804).  With 
an interest group population dominated by organized business, it should be no surprise that the vast 
majority of political activities are performed by businesses or business associations.  A check of the 
Center for Responsive Politics’ database on lobbying by organized interests shows that 93 percent of 
the more than $3.5 billion spent on reregistered lobbyists in 2010 was spent by for-profit 
corporations, business associations, and trade associations.
14
  Of the top 20 lobbying organizations 
from the years 1998 to 2011, the American Association of Retired Persons (AAPR), which ranks 
number 4, is the only group that represents individuals from the general public.  One professional 
trade association, the American Medical Association, which is number 2, is in the top 20.  The rest 
are private corporations such as General Electric (number 3) or business associations such as the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (number 1).
15
   
 Business groups comprise the majority population for other political activities as well.  They 
are more likely to participate in federal elections by forming political action committees (PACs) 
(e.g., Boise 1989; Humphries 1991; Matasar 1986), and they are more likely to contribute to 
independent expenditure advertising campaigns for and against candidates (Muntean 2011).  Gains 
(1996, 40-71) demonstrated how the mobilization advantage is exasperated by campaign finance 
rules, leading to the overwhelming majority of PACs representing for-profit business or occupations.  
Those industries that are heavily regulated and rely on government contracts seem to be the most 
likely to form PACs (Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1991; Humphries 1991).  The electioneering bias 
in favor of corporate and business-related PACs is also likely to last, as a solid plurality of PACs 
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 This percentage was computed by the author using the 2010 lobbying numbers at the Center for 
Responsive Politics website, OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php 
(accessed Oct. 2, 2011).   
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 See http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=a&indexType=s (accessed December 





have been connected to for-profit corporations in every single election cycle since the passage of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002.
16
   
It is beyond dispute that organized business spends more on trying to influence public policy; 
however, it is not entirely clear that the business community’s investments have translated into more 
favorable policies.  A number of authors have discussed the “privileged position of business” (e.g., 
Hunter 1953; Lindblom 1977; Hudson 2009, 213-49), arguing that the business community’s ability 
to shape policy to its liking extends to all stages of the policy process and all policymaking venues.
17
  
The most well-known study on the topic is Lindblom’s (1977) classic Politics and Markets, which 
used both qualitative research and thought experiments to reveal that business can intimidate 
policymakers and keep them from imposing taxes and regulations and even shape the way the public 
thinks about issues.  In some systems, decisions on major issues such as the distribution of wealth, 
the allocation of resources for production, the assignment of labor, and even decisions on what to 
produce would be made by governmental institutions.  In our system, Lindblom notes, these 
decisions are automatically delegated to the business executives.  Delegating these issues to the 
business community effectively turns business executives into de facto public officials with power 
over a large sector of what are, in reality, public issues (p. 172).  Lindblom also presents “the market 
as a prison,” where any discussion of altering the system automatically triggers punishment.  If 
policymakers propose raising taxes, the public faces the threat of business disinvestment and a 
reduction of employment.  He also introduces the concept of “circularity,” where citizens are 
frequently indoctrinated to demand “nothing other than what the decision-making elite is already 
disposed to grant them” (1977, 202).  In such cases, the public comes to believe that its interests are 
the same as business, thus turning citizens into allies of the business community.  Indoctrinating 
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messages equate private enterprise with democracy to the point where attacks on the former are also 
viewed as attacks on the latter.  This process is accomplished by transmitting pro-business messages 
though mass media, schools, and even through elected representatives.   In such a system, 
regulations are viewed as infringements on personal liberty.
18
  
Lindblom’s broad view of business influence seemed to inadequately explain how real-world 
negotiations over taxing and regulatory issues play out, a topic many later scholars have avoided 
studying (Hacker and Pierson 2002).  Other recent examinations of business and public policy have 
focused more narrowly on specific issues or policy venues.  Some, for example, have noted that 
businesses and business associations are most likely to participate in agency public comment periods 
(Kerwin 2003, 182-202).   Lowi (1979) contended that many federal agencies developed “clientele” 
relationships with business interests.  As post-New Deal Congress began regulating more difficult 
issues, Congress delegated more policymaking responsibilities to agencies who developed 
accommodating relationships with the business interests they were supposed to be regulating.  Heclo 
(1978) correspondingly noted the ability of organized business to join “iron triangles” or “issue 
networks,” when interest groups developed close and closed relationships with agencies and 
congressional committees, which prevent other views from being heard.   
Some studies have focused on how specific industries exert influence in a policy area.  
Adams and Sokoloff (1981) demonstrated how for-profit weapon manufacturers encouraged 
increased defense spending in order to obtain more weapons contracts.  Their findings were echoed 
by Burton (1993), whose complaints of Pentagon procurement officers being so eager to satisfy 
contractors led to congressional investigations.  Quinn and Shapiro (1991) used time-series analysis 
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to argue that the rise of for-profit corporate political action committees (PACs) impacted corporate 
tax policies.  Peterson (1993) modeled the strength of the insurance industry in health care debates.  
Fritschler and Rudder (2006) chronicled how Congress, responding to pressure from the tobacco 
industry, hindered the implementation of rules on cigarette marketing and packaging for many years.   
Not all issue-focused studies have concluded that the business community successfully 
shapes public policy.  Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963), in their classic case study on tariffs and 
foreign trade, found little agreement between elite members of the business community.  In fact, the 
majority of their businessmen subjects displayed apathy to foreign trade issues (p. 125).  Their lack 
of generalizability, however, inspired Lowi (1964) to propose a new approach to the study of 
policymaking, which focused on predicting politics from policies, as opposed to actors advocating 
for specific positions.   
Often the business community succeeds because issues important to most business interests 
exist in policy “niches,” issues areas where there is no organized opposition (Browne 1990; Gray 
and Lowery 1996).  These niche business associations tend to be smaller and more well-resourced 
than broad focused public interest and charitable groups (Olson 1965; Schattschneider 1960, 23-32).  
More recent authors have noted examples of issues such as tax policies where organized business 
has carved out policy niches (Ainsworth 2002, 114).  Baumgartner and Leech (2001) argue that 
business’s dominance of policy niches has caused public interests and charitable groups to jump on 
“policy bandwagons,” issues supported by well-funded, business backed lobbying campaigns.  
These bandwagons offer groups with public-interest causes a rare opportunity to further their 
legislative goals.  Similarly, some have noted that public-interest causes can exploit temporary 
cleavages within the business community, when opposing sides of a policy are backed by organized 





Inc., a waste disposal corporation with yearly earnings well into the billions,
19
 joined with 
environmental groups to advocate for stronger waste disposal rules.  Waste Management, one of the 
nation’s largest polluters, was not concerned about the environment.  Instead, the company wanted 
to drive smaller competitors, who would have had a difficult time fulfilling regulations, out of 
business (Hudson 2009, 243).   
The business community’s power in the pressure system partly stems from the variety, or 
“layers,” of representation businesses enjoy.  Hudson (2009, 217-18) identifies three layers of 
representation for business associations.  The first is under large umbrella associations such as the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which represents all forms of business on general issues such as taxes 
and labor laws.  Secondly, large businesses are represented by narrower trade and commodity 
associations, e.g., the National Association of Home Builders, which represents specific segments of 
the business population.  Finally, large for-profit corporations have increasingly sought direct, 
individual representation in Washington, employing their own lobbying staffs.  Godwin, Godwin 
and Ainsworth (2007) argue that large businesses have alternated between these different layers at 
different stages of the policy process.  Businesses seem to rely on their trade association 
representation during the agenda setting stage, recognizing that large coalitions are best for grabbing 
attention, only to break off and lobby independently at the policy adoption point.   
Lyon and Maxwell (2004) discussed the use of “astroturf lobbying,” a term coined by former 
Senator Lloyd Bentsen, which involves subsidizing “organizations” and “campaigns” that appear as 
if they were grassroots movements.  The authors illustrate the incentive of for-profit corporations 
and industries, especially those with poor public reputations, to rely on these misleading campaigns.  
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These business groups have even used astroturf organizations to issue scorecards.
20
  These astroturf 
campaigns have been successfully used to defeat a number of proposed business regulations (e.g., 
Ainsworth 2002, 79-83; Boris and Krehely 2002, 313; Lyon and Maxwell 2004, 564).  For example, 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of American (PhRMA), the trade association for the 
drug industry, created what appeared to be a public interest organization called “Citizens for the 
Right to Know” that successfully argued to Congress that drug stores, not manufactures, were the 
real blame for high drug prices (Ainsworth 2002, 124; Silverstein and Taylor 2004, 269).   
 With so much attention placed on the political activities of organized business, it is 
sometimes forgotten that the business community also spends considerable resources on political 
messaging.  So ubiquitous are the political messages of the modern American business community 
that they are impossible to miss, even if one actively tried to avoid them.  Sit down in a movie 
theater, and before the feature presentation one may view an ad for the film industry’s campaign to 
stop “film piracy.”  Driving around the Gulf Coast almost guarantees one will be bombarded with 
British Petroleum radio ads proclaiming the effects of its oil spill are under control (Thompson 
2010).  The pharmaceutical industry actually runs ads reminding Americans that it spends money on 
research and development and not just on running ads for its products (Albiniak 2002).  The 
business community even directs less overtly political messages toward the public with the goal of 
enhancing our appreciation of the free market (Berry 1997, 120).  Visit a typical American public 
school and one will likely see a corporate ad on the football scoreboard – if one is not covering the 
entire school’s roof to advertise to passing airplanes (Schwartz 1998).  
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 The effects of political messaging are not entirely clear.  Some argue that the majority of 
citizens view pro-business messages as “not credible” (e.g., Herbert 1988).  Yet, there is compelling 
evidence that business messaging has shaped the outcome of some policy debates.  The most notable 
(or infamous) example of an effective ad campaign was the so-called “Harry and Louise” ads, which 
featured a couple of middle-aged actors portraying a married couple worried about losing their 
health insurance if the Clinton health care initiative passed.  The campaign, funded by the health 
insurance industry, played a crucial role in creating negative public opinion over the Clinton plan 
and convincing legislators that true grassroots opposition to reform really existed (West, Heith, and 
Goodwin 1996).  Harry and Louise were so successful that they quickly inspired other industries to 
back similar misleading campaigns (Kolbert 1995).  Smith (2000) argues that when the business 
community is unified on an issue, it is most likely to succeed when it first uses political messaging 
to shape public opinion.   
Demonstrating a direct link between business goals and legislative policy has been one area 
researchers have largely avoided until recently.  The findings of the few recent studies are far from 
conclusive.  Mahoney (2007) used interviews with lobbyists for American businesses to conclude 
that institutional corporate interests were more likely than other interest groups to get what they 
want. Baumgartner and his colleagues (2009) examined many of the same variables as I do, although 
with vastly more resources at their disposal.  They studied 1,244 groups involved with 98 issues.  Of 
these, 416 (the plurality) are business and trade associations, 181 for-profit corporations, 329 citizen 
groups,
21
 and 77 unions.  They use an additive index based off a series of survey questions on six 
different possible changes to policy.  Although the authors were mostly interested in group 
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Rifle Association (NRA), and groups with charitable missions, e.g., the Bread for the World.  It 
appears the majority of “citizen groups” within their study are single-issue groups, such as the NRA.  
I explain how I make a distinction between these types of groups in the methods section of this 





resources, they did note that businesses show significantly higher correlations with preferred policy 
outcomes.  Still, they argue that the impact seemed to be slight (p. 203-04).    
When we look at the entirety of studies on business and public policy, it seems safe to infer 
that organized business is rather successful at getting what it wants from policymakers, although 
there are certainly exceptions to this generalization.  It is more difficult to glean from the body of 
academic literature, however, whether business is any more likely than other sectors of interests to 
achieve policy success.  Few studies have made any types of comparisons across interest group 
sectors.  While we may postulate that business success often comes at the expense of organized 
labor, the policy goals of public interests and charitable groups are often outside of the realm of 
concern for the business community.  Whether it is the business community’s immense investments 
in political activities or its privileged position within the system that drives its success is another 
question we unable to answer.  As the discussions in the next two sections illustrate, reaching a 
consensus on how political activities shape public policy has been quite difficult.  And trying to 
disentangle the impact of political activities from the interest groups who perform them is an 
endeavor researchers have yet to undertake.   
Money and Electioneering  
The vast majority of interest group research has focused on two variables as predictors of 
policy influence: PAC contributions and lobbying (e.g., Slatzman 1987; Grenzke 1989; Fleisher 
1993; McKay 2010; Smith 1984; Wright 1990; Baumgartner et al 2009).  Both of these activities are 
included in my study, although, as mentioned in the following paragraphs, my examination of 
interest group electioneering goes beyond PAC contributions.  While the overall body of literature 
on both electioneering and lobbying has failed to yield definitive findings with respect to the 





can lead to policy success.
22
  Still, a discussion of these two activities, regardless of their potential 
policy impact, would probably be warranted in any study of interest groups and congressional 
policy.  After all, it is hard to imagine two activities more closely associated with interest groups.   
Elections create an indirect route through which organized interests can achieve policy 
success.  The direct route is by lobbying, which in its truest form involves persuasion.  Convincing a 
policymaker to agree with one’s own opinion is the essence of political discourse in democracies.  
Yet, what if one were able to ensure that the policymaker in question already agreed with his or her 
position?  Doing so eliminates the need to persuade.  This is the indirect route to policy success.  By 
spending to elect candidates with whom they agree, interest groups can increase their satisfaction 
with policy.   
Efforts by interest groups to shape election outcomes present two possible problems.  First, 
one wealthy group (or collection of like-minded groups) could so heavily spend on campaigns that 
participation by all other interests is effectively drowned out.  Second, contributions (if they were 
large enough) to legislators who already hold office could lead to the direct form of policy success 
by convincing officeholders to change their positions.  In other words, contributions could lead to 
vote buying.  Most of our nation’s campaign finance rules have been designed to address both of 
these problems, although most studies on electioneering by interest groups have focused on the 
second.  
Given the fighting and controversy that surrounds contemporary campaign finance debates, it 
is hard to believe that for more than 100 years there were virtually no rules governing contributions 
to federal public officials (Zardkoohi 1985).   In this absence of regulatory measures, business 
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groups exercised tremendous influence with legislators.  Even legendary Senator Daniel Webster 
partook of the fringe benefits of serving in Congress, at one point receiving more than $30,000 from 
bankers to oppose regulations (Deakin 1966, 52).  It was not until the Progressive Era, which 
ushered in many governing reforms, that Congress passed the Tillman Act of 1907, the first 
campaign finance law.  Originally, the act banned corporate donations to candidates, and was soon 
amended to prohibit corporate campaign expenditures as well (Epstein 1980, 160).  Although the act 
remained on the books for more than 50 years, it was frequently circumvented and, in some cases, 
completely ignored (Zardkoohi 1985, 805).  With the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Congress again tried 
to restrict interest group participation by prohibiting corporations and, this time, also labor unions 
from using their general revenues to influence federal elections through independent campaign 
activities.
23
  As a compromise to ban business electioneering activities, more liberal members of 
Congress agreed to a ban on union contributions to strengthen business prohibitions (Ainsworth 
2002, 187; Glasser 2010).   
Serious reform measures did not emerge until the 1970s.  In 1971, Congress passed the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which attempted to consolidate many previous incremental 
reform efforts.  Contributions from individuals to a candidate committee were capped at $1,000 per 
election (Ainsworth 2002, 188).  More importantly for interest groups, businesses and labor unions 
were once again allowed to participate by establishing political action committees (PACs).
24
  
Businesses and unions could use PACs as a means of communicating with and raising funds from 
their stockholders or union members and individual family members.  Individual contributions to 
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 A temporary war-time ban on labor union contributions was included in the War Labor Disputes 
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Goidel, Gross, and Shields (1999, 24).   
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PACs and PAC contributions to candidates were capped at $5,000 (Ainsworth 2002, 188; Zardkoohi 
1985, 805-06;) and remain at this level today.   
Although groups now had a vehicle through which to legally participate, the number of new 
PACs grew slowly at first.  Developments in 1974, however, would lay the seeds for rapid growth.  
Following the Watergate scandal and serious allegations of abuse by President Nixon’s Committee 
to Re-elect the President, Congress amended FECA.  The 1974 amendments had two major 
implications for interest groups, especially for businesses.  First, the amendments lifted a ban on 
businesses with federal contracts from forming PACs.  Second, they established the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC), which was tasked with implementing all election laws.  The FEC, like any 
agency tasked with enforcing congressional mandates, was delegated interpreting and rulemaking 
powers.  When Sun Oil Company sought clarification from the FEC on rules for developing PACs, 
the FEC made one of its “most important rulings ever” (Ainsworth 2002, 188).  It is important to 
note that there have traditionally been two types of PACs: “separate and segregate funds” (SSF) 
PACs and “nonconnected” PACs.
25
  Most PACs are of the SSF strain, meaning they are 
administered by a parent organization, usually a business or union.  Nonconnected PACs are 
essentially stand-alone organizations.
26
  Sun Oil had requested from the FEC permission to spend its 
general revenues – corporate funds that were not raised through donations to its SSF PAC (SUN-
PAC) – to administer and raise contributions.  The FEC granted Sun Oil’s request, leading to an 
explosion of new corporate PACs (Ainsworth 2002, 188; Anders 1985, 214; Epstein 1980, 359; 
Zardkoohi 1985, 806).  The percentage of Fortune 500 companies with PACs shot from less than 2 
percent before the ruling up to 52 percent by 1980 (Anders 1985).  Corporate PACs (those affiliated 
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with for-profit corporations) have since been the most common type of PACs (Gains 1996; 
Humphries 1991; Matasar 1986).  In 1976, Congress amended FECA again, this time allowing 
nonprofit corporations such as “social welfare” organizations (nonprofit associations under 
subsection 501[c][4]) and business and professional trade associations to also establish SSF PACs 
and administer them with their general revenue (Epstein 1980, 359).   
If there is one topic within interest group studies that has been overly examined, it is the 
effects of PAC contributions.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the popularity of PACs as a 
topic stems from the fact that they are the only easily available source of data on interest groups 
activities.  While studies of PACs have been numerous, conclusions on whether they influence 
policy decisions have been far from consistent.  In fact, some of the best research on the effects of 
PACs has avoided examining if contributions influence voting behavior altogether.  Hall and 
Wayman (1990), for example, found that money may not be able to buy votes, but it can influence 
the amount of attention a group’s issue(s) receive from legislators.  Similarly, Langbein (1986) 
found that contributions can increase access to legislators.   
If there is a generalizable finding on whether contributions influence legislative voting 
behavior, it is that any effect is minimal at best.  Slatzman (1987) actually claimed to have found a 
direct significant relationship between legislators’ AFL-CIO scorecard ratings and PAC 
contributions, but his findings have since been dismissed as endogenous (Wawro 2001, 565).  PAC 
studies must take the legislator’s voting predisposition into account (ibid.), as groups are likely to 
give money to those who already agree with the organization (Grenzke 1989; Fleisher 1993).  This is 
especially true with unions (McKay 2010).  Stratmann (1995) says contributions can have a 
cumulative effect, producing influence after long periods of giving.  Roscoe and Jenkins (2005) 
conducted a meta-analysis of more than 30 PAC studies, finding that those which fail to control for 





Still, there is some evidence that contributions can have an impact under very specific 
circumstances.   In his amazingly comprehensive review of interest group activities, Smith describes 
occasions in which contributions can impact decisions: 
When the visibility of the issue is low [11 studies]; when the issue is specialized, 
technical, or narrow [4]; when the issue is non-partisan and non-ideological [8]; 
when the public is indifferent, divided, or ignorant [8]; when the position advocated 
by the interest group is unopposed by any other interest groups [6]; when the interest 
groups who contribute also lobby the issue intensely [2]; when the contributions are 
given to influence legislative outcomes (as opposed to the election outcomes) [1]; in 
the case of senators, when an election is drawing near [2]; when members are 
ideologically moderate [1]; and when the general political climate of opinion is 
consistent with the objectives of the interest group [1] (Smith 1995, 94-95).  
 
PAC contributions to U.S. senators during each of the election cycles within my study are 
included in my dataset.  Still, groups can influence elections in more ways than just making 
contributions to candidates.  This was not always the case, however.  Originally, FECA defined any 
“expenditure” (whether money or other valuable assets) with the purpose of influencing an election 
as a contribution (Briffault, 2005, 957).  This essentially prevented groups from any electoral 
activities other than making contributions, which were capped, to candidates or parties.   
Advertisements purchased by interest groups mentioning candidates around election time were 
effectively banned.  Any ads mentioning candidates were deemed “in-kind donations,” which meant 
that the group purchasing the ad had to register as a political committee with the FEC (Hayward 
1993-1994, 52).  Of course, political committees are only allowed to raise money (which is subject 
to contribution limits) directly from individuals, which meant unions and for-profit and non-profit 
corporations could not use their general revenues.  Since donations were capped at $5,000, well 
below the necessary amount to purchase radio and television ads even in the 1970s, groups were 
relegated to making only PAC contributions.  This extremely narrow role for interest groups would 





on non-PAC electioneering expenses, claiming that it violated the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment.   
In the landmark case Buckley v. Valeo (1976),
27
 an extremely fractured Supreme Court 
majority agreed, in part, with groups challenging the law.
28
  The Court created two non-PAC-
contribution options for groups looking to influence elections.  First, groups could use their PAC 
funds (FEC-regulated “hard money”) to purchase “independent expenditures,” election-related 
expenses other than contributions made directly to candidates or political parties (Briffault 2005, 
953).  Most independent expenditures take the form of advertising, although the type of ad can vary 
from television to direct mail.  Independent expenditures are permissible as long as they are not 
coordinated with candidates’ campaigns.  PAC independent expenditures are reported to the FEC 
and are included in my study.   
Second, the Court also ruled that groups were permitted to run ads with non-PAC funds (i.e., 
their general revenue), even if the ads clearly sought to promote or oppose a candidate for federal 
office, as long as they avoided “express advocacy” on behalf of candidates.  Express advocacy ads 
were those that used the so-called “magic words.”
29
  Any other advertisements were considered 
“issue advocacy” and were thus protected speech (Briffault 2005, 957).  Although the distinction 
seems clear-cut as discussed here, considerable legal battles ensued between the FEC and interest 
groups over what constituted an “issue ad” versus “express advocacy” (Hayward 1993-1994; 
Moramarco 1999-2000).  Following the Court’s ruling, interest groups spent considerably more on 
issue ads than they ever did through PAC contributions (Briffault 1999; Cigler 2004, 239; West 
2000).  Unlike PAC contributions, however, groups did not have to report how much they spent on 
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“cast your ballot for,” “Smith for Congress,” “vote against,” “defeat,” and “reject.”  See Briffault 





issue ads (West 2000, 150), and, as a result, political scientists, for the most part, did not attempt to 
study whether spending on issue ads had any direct or indirect effects on policy.
30
  The distinction 
between issue ads and express advocacy ads is no longer important, as following the Court’s ruling 
in Citizens United v. FEC (2010)
31
 groups are now permitted to purchase express advocacy ads with 
their non-PAC funds.   
Issue ads would not even be mentioned here, were it not for recent election cycles that have 
permitted the purchase – and FEC disclosure – of issue ads by so-called 527 organizations.  How 
interest groups came to use 527s is yet another recent twist in electioneering law.  Early after the 
FECA was enacted, the FEC ruled it did not have the power to regulate contributions made directly 
to party committees (organizations such as the Democratic National Committee) as long as the 
contributions were to be used for “party-building” activities (Malbin 2006, 5-6).  By the 1990s, 
however, exception allowing parties to spend unregulated donations for “party building activities” 
had grown to allow all expenditures that were not express advocacy ads.  In other words, the issue ad 
distinction the Supreme Court devised to protect the free speech rights of interest groups grew into a 
standard that governed electioneering spending even for the political parties.  As a result, both major 
political parties began raising “soft money,” unlimited contributions to the parties not regulated by 
the FEC (ibid.).  Soon, both sides were raising and spending soft money in ways that were very 
clearly intended to influence election outcomes.  In the mid-1990s, the major committees for the 
Democratic and Republican parties were both running issue ads in favor of candidates funded 
entirely with soft money (Briffault 2000).  Although voters could tell little difference between soft-
money ads and FEC-regulated ads, the former were legal only because they lacked the final call to 
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action, e.g., “vote for Bill Smith.”
32
  By the 1996 election, soft money spending had grown to the 
point where more money was spent outside of the FECA/FEC regulatory system than within it 
(Alexander 1999).   
 While the practice of parties raising and spending soft money was not exactly a return to the 
unregulated days of legislators offering their votes on the floor of Congress for campaign 
contributions, there was compelling evidence cited by reformers of a corrupting influence of the new 
reality (Cigler 2004, 238; Van Natta and Oppel 2000).
 33
  Although corporations and unions were 
prohibited from using their general revenue to contribute to candidates, both groups were able to 
contribute unlimited amounts of soft money to parties because it was technically not being used to 
expressly advocate in favor of a candidate.  For a while, soft money contributions to the parties even 
escaped disclosure rules, allowing the parties to run ads without revealing who helped pay for them 
(Cigler 2004, 238).  Since soft money went to the political parties, which obviously coordinated and 
worked with candidates, it gave at least the appearance of having the same effect as large, 
unregulated contributions given directly to candidates.   
 Kingdon envisions the policymaking process as the merging of three distinct streams: 
problems, policies, and politics (2003, 87).  According to his model, these streams flow along 
separately only producing policy when they come together.  Often this “coupling” of streams is a 
result of policy entrepreneurs, advocates on behalf of policy adoption (p. 122).  In the late 1990s, the 
problems and policy streams quickly became visible as the probable impact of soft money started to 
be recognized.  More and more cases began to come to light of for-profit corporations receiving 
                                                          
32
 Although the vast majority of soft money was used for campaign advertising, it was also used for 
“get out the vote” (GOTV) and registering activities.  As with television ads, these activities were 
frequently aimed at helping a specific candidate.   
33
 One notable such incident involved the discovery of a Democratic National Committee 
fundraising memo for Al Gore that instructed the Vice President to ask for a $100,000 contribution 
from a prominent trial attorney in Beaumont, Texas and at the same time reference President 





benefits such as tax exemptions, patent extensions, and huge federal grants for research (Donovan 
and Bowler 2004, 160-61).  Reform-minded groups such as Common Cause, which played a pivotal 
role in creating FECA, pushed for a ban on soft money contributions.  Media reporting of soft 
money influence increased.  Yet, it seemed with the election of George W. Bush, who had openly 
opposed soft money reforms as a candidate, that the political stream would never come into play.   
 In late 2001, however, the public mood began to tip heavily in favor of reform.  Scheberle 
(1994) asserts that the most persuasive events “in terms of their ability to achieve prominent agenda 
status, are those that describe deliberate attempts by willful governmental or private actors to 
conceal problems.”  Reformers were presented with such an agenda-impacting event with the 
collapse of the energy company Enron and the discovery that its executives had contributed millions 
to a number of politicians, including large soft money contributions to the Republican Party.  The 
Enron debacle was followed by what seemed to the public to be a nearly endless list of Fortune 500 
companies that were involved in deceitful business practices, including Adelphia, Tyco 
International, and WorldCom, which broke Enron’s record for the nation’s largest bankruptcy.  With 
the 2002 mid-term elections approaching, President Bush, himself the recipient of a number of 
Enron contributions and a close friend of the company’s CEO, reversed his previous opposition to 
reform and signed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which banned all soft money 
contributions to parties.
34
   
 Despite the significance of BCRA, it technically only amended the FECA framework.  Even 
its most ardent supporters would be forced to admit that it was a patchwork attempt to plug leaks 
that had sprung in the older system (Malbin 2006, 2-4).  In 2004, the first election under BCRA, 
some soft money that once went to the parties started being funneled to previously obscure 
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organizations known as “527 groups,” named after the section of the tax code under which they 
filed.  To observers of the 2004 election press coverage, 527s appeared to be an ingenious (if not 
also underhand) post-BCRA creation devised to undermine the campaign finance system (Kingsley 
and Pomeranz 2004, 81).  In reality, 527s came into existence shortly after Congress passed the 1974 
FECA amendments.  Prior to the 1970s, organizations receiving only campaign contributions – and 
no other income – were not required to file with the IRS.  This changed in 1975 when Congress 
created Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) for FEC-regulated, hard money 
organizations (i.e., PACs, party committees, and candidate committees) to file under for tax 
purposes.  Congress specifically defined Section 527 as for “political organizations,” which were 
groups with a primary purpose of influencing elections (Briffault 2005, 955).  For this reason, 
Congress stipulated that groups filing under Section 527 were completely exempt from IRS rules on 
partisan “political activities” placed on traditional nonprofits falling under Section 501(c) 
designations (Kingsley and Pomeranz 2004, 82).
35
  Furthermore, groups under Section 527 were also 
exempt from gift taxes, which applied to most 501(c) organizations (ibid., 100-01).   
Congress mistakenly assumed, however, that all groups filing under Section 527 would be 
FEC-regulated entities, such as PACs.  Shortly after the Buckley ruling, political activists recognized 
an opportunity.  By creating a 527 organization that did not make contributions directly to 
candidates and avoided expressed advocacy, a group could avoid FEC regulations applied to hard-
money organizations, such as limits on donations to the organization and having to disclose donor 
information to the FEC.  Plus, the group would be exempt from IRS electioneering rules applied to 
traditional nonprofits (Briffault 2005, 956-58; Kingsley and Pomeranz 2004).  These non-hard 
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money organizations filing under Section 527 would later be dubbed by the press as “527 groups,” 
and they were uniquely positioned to play a role in the post-BCRA environment.   
 The ban on soft money going to parties coupled with BRCA’s new ban on issue ads for 
groups that made direct contributions to candidates through a connect PAC,
36
 contributed, in part, to 
a growth in the number of overtly political 527s because, unlike PACs, their contributions could 
come from organizations, were not capped, and did not have to be reported to the FEC.  Big 527s, 
such as Moveon.org and Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, specialized in the issue ads that outside 
groups used before BCRA and the political parties were using with soft money.  When it became 
evident that 527s were playing a pivotal role in the 2004 presidential election, Kingdon’s (2003) 
policymaking streams quickly came back together.  A New York Times editorial bemoaned that “No 
sooner had [BRCA] become law than party financiers found a loophole and created groups known as 
527s” (Real-World 2004).  Campaign finance reformers, joined with Republicans who feared the left 
had more successfully utilized 527s, and petitioned the FEC to begin regulating 527s as political 
committees (Sidwell 2004).
37
  Under intense political pressure, the FEC issued rules to regulate 527s 
after the 2004 election (Briffault 2005).  As a result, 527s attempting to influence the outcome of 
federal elections must now report their expenses to the FEC.
38  
 
 The use of creating 527s to produce issue ad will fall from favor fallowing the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. FEC (2010), which eliminates the need for groups to avoid 
engaging in express advocacy.  The fact remains, however, the 527s were an integral part of the 
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campaign landscape for several election cycles during the years of my study.  The FEC has data on 
electioneering expenses of 527 organizations, starting with the 2006 election cycle.
39
  A number of 
interest groups have formed affiliated 527s.  These electioneering tools have been particularly 
popular with unions (Briffault 2005, 980; Weissman and Hassan 2006, 90).  No study has ever 
examined the policy effects of 527 expenses, probably because expenses are not matched to any 
specific candidate or race.
40
  Since I do not examine specific legislators, however, 527 expenses are 
included in my study.
41
   
 All told, my study includes a more comprehensive examination of interest group electoral 
activities than the vast majority of past studies.  Because past studies have chosen to examine 
campaign expenditures through the direct policy-effect lens (i.e., they ask the question: does a 
contribution cause a legislator to change his vote?) researchers examining campaign activities have 
been hampered by having to tie expenditures to individual legislators.  I take a broader, aggregated 
approach (examining all U.S. senators together) and, therefore, am therefore able to incorporate all 
of a group’s campaign expenditures reported to the FEC.  Maybe a group’s expenditures can directly 
influence policy.  Or maybe a group can simply spend a large amount of money and elect an entirely 
new slate of legislators, thus indirectly effecting policy.  Either way, my model should detect if any 
significant relationship exists between policy and campaign expenses.   
Lobbying and Policy Influence  
Lobbying, like electioneering, is a multi-billion dollar industry, which only promises to 
grow.  Since 1998, the total amount spent on registered lobbyists in Washington has ballooned from 
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$1.44 billion to $3.33 billion for 2011.
42
  The public perception of lobbying, of course, is not too 
good (Baran 2006).  The negative view of lobbying is only nourished by images in pop culture 
depictions such as those in HBO’s recent series K Street and high-profile scandals involving 
individuals like Jack Abramoff.  In reality, however, lobbying is quite an essential activity in 
Washington.  Members of Congress and their staffs will freely admit they are not experts on most 
issues (Browne and Paik 1993).  Most would not have the first clue as to what is a safe level of 
sulfur particulate matter for individuals to inhale throughout their daily routines.  They need 
information to make such decisions, and lobbyists are a valuable source of such information 
(Ainsworth 1993; Rasmusen 1993).   
Movements to regulate lobbying share many similarities with efforts to regulate interest 
group participation in campaigns.  In the face of widespread opposition, Congress has usually passed 
acts narrowly tailored to focus on specific groups or sectors of the economy.  Only after long periods 
of deliberation (and sometimes scandal) does sufficient political will usually build to pass more 
comprehensive regulations.  In the early days of the republic, lobbying was an unregulated activity; 
but rules for lobbying were not badly needed.  Most policy was made at the state or local level.  At 
the federal level, “lobby-agents” (their name originating from their practice of hanging out in the 
halls of Congress) represented individuals, not groups, who had very specific and narrow grievances 
(Ainsowth 2002, 104; Berry and Wilcox 2009, 6).  Frequent clients of early lobbyists were veterans 
seeking unprocessed benefits.  Following the Civil War, a flood of Union veterans were petitioning 
the federal government for pensions.  A few lobbyists soon recognized the inefficiencies of lobbying 
for one veteran at a time and instead sought to represent many through an organization known as the 
Grand Army of the Republic (GAR).  Representing GAR, these entrepreneurial lobbyists advocated 
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for general legislation on veterans’ benefits such the Arrears Act of 1879 and Disability Pension Act 
of 1890, in the process becoming some of the earliest lobbyists to represent a broad sector of society 
(Ainsworth 1995 and 2002, 105).   
 It was around this time of growth in the profession that lobbying came to be seen as 
disdainful and self-serving (Ainsworth 2002, 105).  Lobbyists were quickly being associated in the 
minds of many policymakers with scandal.  Following two particularly high-profile events in 1876 
(involving federal liquor taxes and expansion of the Union Pacific railroad) the House of 
Representatives passed the first act requiring group representatives to register as lobbyists, although 
the resolution expired the next year and was not renewed (Ornstein and Elder 1978, 98).   
 The corruption of the spoils system led to pushes for permanent lobbying measures.  These 
early legislative efforts tried putting a face on groups that misrepresented their intentions or inflated 
their populist reach.  One investigation by Senator Thaddeus Caraway (D-Ark) concluded that 90 
percent of roughly 400 organizations represented by lobbyists in Washington were “fake” and 
operating solely to raise money under the pretense of “promoting some theory of government in 
which [donors] are interested.”
43
  President Wilson, responding to intense opposition to his tariff 
proposals, prodded Congress into launching the first formal investigation into such activities.  The 
investigation led to the proposal of legislation in 1913 that contained lobbying disclosure 
requirements.  However, a predictable opposition from business interests – combined with 
unexpected opposition from farm and labor organizations – resulted in the bill’s failure to become 
law (Ornstein and Elder 1978, 99-100).  In the absence of comprehensive lobbying reform measures, 
Congress instead passed legislation aimed at certain sectors of the economy.  The Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935, for example, contained provisions preventing utility companies from 
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contributing to political parties and requiring anyone who lobbied on their behalf to register with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Ornstein and Elder 1978, 100-01; Zeller 1948, 240-41).   
 Fresh off victories in World War II, Congress finally passed its first far-reaching lobbying 
reform measure, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (FRLA) of 1946.  Remarkably, the bill 
passed with little opposition or fanfare.  In fact, it was actually part of the larger Legislative 
Reorganization Act.  While the act did not restrict spending on lobbying activities, a goal of many 
reformers, it did require any person employed for the principal purpose of influencing legislation to 
register with each house of Congress as a lobbyist and file quarterly financial reports.  Lobbyists 
also had to identify their employers and state their legislative objectives (Ornstein and Elder 1978, 
100-01; Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 318).  Like most policies regulating interest groups, however, 
the constitutionality of FRLA was quickly challenged.  In U.S. v. Harriss (1954)
44
, the Supreme 
Court greatly narrowed the law’s application.  Primarily, the Court ruled regulations could only 
apply to direct lobbying of legislators, allowing groups to lobby agencies and courts without 
registering.  Further, the Court stated that groups whose main efforts were geared toward stimulating 
public pressure on Congress (i.e., grassroots lobbying) were exempt (Ornstein and Elder 1978, 104; 
Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 320-21).   
 The modified version of the FRLA following the Harriss ruling would remain the nation’s 
only policy regulating lobbying for the next 40 years.  As the size of the federal government grew, 
so did the number of lobbyists in Washington, who were representing increasingly diverse sectors of 
society.  It quickly became apparent that FRLA’s registration requirements were inadequate, as most 
individuals lobbying were not registering as lobbyists (Ainsworth 2002, 129).  Numerous attempts to 
update registration requirements would fail until Congress passed the Lobbying Disclosure Act 
(LDA) of 1995.  Most notable about the LDA is that it remains possibly the only comprehensive 
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interest group reform measure not drafted or passed in the wake of a scandal (Krishnakumar 2007, 
518).  Registered lobbyists comply with the LDA by filling out forms created by the Clerk of the 
House and the Secretary of the Senate, where the forms are reviewed and then made available to the 
public, in hard copy at the Legislative Resource Center and at the Senate Office of Public Records in 
Washington, D.C. and, to a more limited extent, online through the Senate’s official website.
45
 
 The LDA follows the same regulatory premise as previous lobbying reforms by requiring 
lobbyists to disclose their clients’ names creates an incentive to behave more honestly 
(Krishnakumar 2007).  This assumption may not be true, as a number of scholars have noted that 
maintaining access to legislators may be the most powerful incentive for lobbyists to be honest, at 
least when dealing with legislators (Axelrod 1984; Ornstein and Elder 1978).  Ornstein and Elder 
(1978, 77) quoted one lobbyists as saying, “As long as the members believe I’m honest and play 
straight with them, I’ll have a chance to make my case.”   
 Despite any shortcomings of the LDA it has provided political and policy scientists with an 
institutionally supported source of data on lobbying activities, something that academics have long 
needed.  Lobbying is the most formalized method of advocacy available to interest groups (Suárez 
and Hwang 2008, 94).  Yet, compared to work with campaign contributions, researchers have been 
less enthusiastic about studying the effects of lobbying until recently (Baumgartner et al. 2009; 
Smith 1995).  It seems safe to assume that having little in the way of financial data on lobbying 
expenses (only recently remedied) has contributed to the lack of empirical investigations.  Smith 
(1995, 91), as evidence for this argument, notes that most research on lobbying has been theoretical, 
whereas most studies on campaign contributions have been empirical.   
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 Some scholars have pointed to a divide between public and academic perceptions over how 
influential lobbying is believed to be (Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz 2009, 402-03; Smith 1995, 97).  
The public often perceives lobbyists as power-players, twisting the arms of legislators into doing the 
bidding of their clients.  Scholars, however, have been much more skeptical of lobbying’s impact on 
policies.  Study findings have been far from conclusive, as many researchers have been confounded 
by mythological and measurement problems.  Besides the endogeneity obstacle mentioned with the 
PAC literature, several scholars have noted that past studies have failed to take into account the 
potential spuriousness caused by lobbying and PAC contributions being so closely linked 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 15; Smith 1995, 122-23; Wright 1996).  Studying lobbying is also 
complicated by groups often lobbying legislators with whom they already agree (Bauer, Pool, and 
Dexter 1963; McKay 2010).    
 Despite methodological and conceptual difficulties, some studies have concluded lobbying to 
be successful, albeit under specific conditions.  There is evidence, for instance, that lobbyists can be 
effective at convincing legislators that their issues and clients are salient.  Schattschneider (1935, 
224-25) described the “first law of behavior in pressure politics” in which groups naturally seek to 
exaggerate the importance of their issues and ability to “speak for whole categories of loose 
aggregates.”  Grassroots lobbying, in particular, seems to be an effective technique for employing 
such a lobbying strategy.  Goldstein (1999, 40-41) cites a 1993 battle over tax deductions for 
business lunches as an example of when the National Restaurant Association (the less well-known 
NRA) used such a tactic.  Although restaurant owners and wealthy business members were clearly 
the beneficiaries of such a policy, the NRA successfully used female waitresses of NRA-member 
restaurants in press conferences and television advertisements to plea with legislators not to cut 





issue but created the perception that those lobbying to retain deductions were speaking for more than 
just “fat cat” businessmen.   
 Smith (1984) similarly found that interest group lobbying can shift as many as 30 to 40 votes 
in the House of Representatives (a considerable sum) by attaching the right values and beliefs to 
legislative proposals.  He notes that legislators’ values and beliefs are quite consistent; however, 
their interpretations of specific policies are less static and, on occasion, are based on partial 
understandings of a policy’s consequences.  On such occasions, lobbyists can, over repeated 
meetings and discussions, foster a legislative interpretation of a policy that is adventitious to his or 
her clients.  Subsequent studies have noted other conditions in which lobbying may be effective.  
Schlozman and Tierney (1986, 314) found that lobbying is successful when issues are “shielded” 
from public scrutiny.  Wright (1990) argued that the number of lobbying contacts a committee 
member has, especially when the lobbyist holds more expertise than the member, is a better 
predictor of voting than campaign contributions.  In his 1995 review of interest group activities, 
Smith outlined the following conditions under which lobbying seems to be successful:  
When the members of Congress believe that the substantive expertise of the interest 
groups exceeds their own [2 studies]; when group access is costly or uncertain [1]; 
when the groups are part of a broad group coalition [2]; when the views of the 
groups are strongly shared by a large number of citizens who are not members of the 
groups [1]; when the ability of voters to monitor congressional behavior is low [1]; 
when the issue is “shielded from public or media scrutiny” and does not arouse 
“deeply felt convictions, lines of party cleavage, or particularistic constituency 
needs” [1]; when there is no opposition – and, preferably, active support – from the 
public, other organized interests, and public officials [2]; when interest groups have 
adequate time to execute their lobbying strategies [1]; when the interest groups both 
possess and devote sufficient resources to execute their lobbying strategies and enjoy 
a comparative resource advantage over their opponents [1]; and when the groups 
have strongly supported the members of Congress in the previous election and have 
many politically active group members in the district [1] (Smith 1995, 106-07).   
 
More recent studies have had the benefit of examining lobbying returns in compliance with 





influence of lobbyists.  First, there is Baumgartner et al (2009), who conclude that lobbying is far 
less influential than the public often perceives.  In the study of their nearly 100 issues, they find that 
an organization’s lobbying resources only contribute to policy success in a small percentage of 
campaigns.  Instead, most policy outcomes, no matter how strong the lobbying campaigns, tend to 
display a strong status quo bias.  On the other hand, there is Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz (2009) 
who take a completely different approach by examining for-profit corporations’ lobbying 
expenditures on one issue, a tax provision within the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004.  
Examining this provision, which allow multinational corporations a one-time deduction of dividends 
received from a foreign subsidiary, allowed the authors to compare groups’ lobbying expenditures in 
favor of the bill to the monetary benefit groups received when it passed.  They found that 
corporations save $220 for every $1 spent on lobbying, a “return on investment for lobbying” (as 
they put it) that equals 22,000 percent.   
Alexander and her colleagues offer a potentially new perspective for the examination of 
influence activities by interest groups.  Unlike most other studies, they do not attempt to grapple 
with the endogeneity problem that has dogged previous scholars.  The tax-deduction provision of the 
AJCA could very well have passed without the participation of the groups that lobbied in favor of it.  
But if lobbying parties do see such a potentially large return on investment, they would most likely 
rationalize that they have little to lose in trying.  Even Baumgartner et al (2009) conclude that 
lobbying campaigns are occasionally successful, and on such occasions the policy changes they spur 
are major.  If we assume that Alexander and her associates’ rate of return is applicable to lobbying 
on other economic policies, then it would be foolish for large for-profit corporations not to lobby.  
For even if there is only a 1 percent possibility of success, the 1 time a group succeeds would more 





Conclusions on Interest Groups and Public Policy 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of interest groups to the American political system.  
This chapter reviewed several areas of scholarly interest with the study of interest groups.  The most 
consistent findings within the literature on interest groups have come from studies on mobilization 
and why individuals join groups.  Scholars have convincingly shown wealth and education are 
highly correlated with participation in interest groups.  Most importantly, the mobilization research 
has confirmed that individuals are far more likely to organize around private and economic interest 
than public causes.  The mobilization literature helps to explain why for-profit corporations and 
business associations constitute the majority of the interest group population.   
Researchers have successfully described the interest group population but have provided few 
clear explanations of how groups can successfully shape public policy.  It is rather obvious that the 
business community spends more on political activities than any other sector of organized interests. 
Yet, scholars have struggled in trying to determine if the business community’s investments have 
translated into higher levels of policy success, at least beyond the agenda-setting stage or outside of 
small policymaking environments such as local communities or government agencies.  A 
considerable amount of scholarly energy has also been spent studying the effects of PAC 
contributions and lobbying, although the conclusions of research on these topics is also far from 
clear.  It appears the ability of groups to influence policy with these activities is limited to narrow 
circumstances at best.  Furthermore, the policy effects of some political activities, such as issue ad 
expenditures, have gone mostly unexamined.  At the very least, there is little lost from wealthier 
groups spending small percentages of their overall resources on political activities.  
In this chapter I have discussed the laws that govern the political activities of all interest 
groups.  Interest groups with tax exempt statuses, however, must comply with addition rules 





discuss the tax policy that shapes the nonprofit landscape.  I discuss the types of groups included in 
this study and the laws governing electioneering and lobbying by nonprofits.  Internal Revenue 
Service rules on political activities have been far less examined by scholars and the press and, 
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III. ADVOCACY BY NONPROFITS AND NONPROFIT ADVOCACY 
Introduction 
Two of the burgeoning topics within interest group studies are the activities of nonprofit 
interest groups and advocacy for nonprofit causes.  While some scholarly discussions have 
occasionally intermingled these two topics, they are two separate issues.  Literature on advocacy 
by nonprofits, i.e., interest groups with tax-exempt statuses, focuses on organizational structures.  
This line of research has examined how tax, lobbying, and electioneering policy have come 
together to shape membership associations and how they engage in political activities (e.g., Reid 
2006).  Most studies on this topic can be found in legal journals, especially those focusing on tax 
and administrative law (e.g., Kingsley and Pomeranz 2005; Briffault 2005).  Some of the recent 
developments, spurred by court rulings such as Citizens United v. FEC (2010), have yet to be 
analyzed in scholarly journals but are subjects of discussion by news outlets and research 
institutions such as the Campaign Finance (e.g., Malbin, Brusoe, and Glavin 2011).  
Literature on advocacy for nonprofit causes, i.e., nonprofit advocacy, addresses the 
unique challenges facing groups that advocate on behalf of social services and public interests.  
While authors in the first line of research have mostly been legal scholars or with research 
institutions, authors in this second line of research have mostly been political scientists (e.g., 
Berry 2005 and 2006; Berry and Arons 2003; Salamon 2002).  Another way to visualize the 
distinction of the two topics is: All groups engaged in “nonprofit advocacy” are nonprofits; but 
not all advocacy by nonprofits is nonprofit advocacy.  If the last sentence only serves to further 
confuse matters, hopefully the proceeding sections will clear things up.    
In this chapter, I discuss the four types of groups examined in this study: business and 





groups.  It is important to understand that these each of groups must comply with IRS lobbying 
and electioneering restrictions in addition to the more well-known federal statutes such as those 
discussed in chapter 2.  I provide some discussion of tax rules that govern the political activities 
of nonprofits, paying particular attention to charitable groups, whose activities are most limited 
by tax policy.  I end with a review of literature on how tax rules and other interest group 
regulations have incentivized groups to develop “complex organizational structures,” managing 
multiple tax-exempt entities (Kerlin and Reid 2009; Boris and Kerhely 2002; Reid 2001), in 
order to purse their policy goals.  Using multiple tax-exempt statuses as a method to influence 
public policy will become increasingly popular following recent Supreme Court rulings that led 
to the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) development of independent expenditure 
committees (i.e., the so-called super PACs).  
Economic-based Tax-exempt Groups 
 There are 28 different types of tax-exempt (or “nonprofit”) organizations that file under 
section 501(c) of the tax code.
46
  Congress is frequently adding new members to the nonprofit 
population.  The newest addition to section 501(c) is subsection (29), which was created for 
health insurance cooperatives implemented under the Affordable Care Act of 2010.
47
  The 
majority of these nonprofit organizations have no interest in influencing public policy as a 
primary or even secondary concern.  In this chapter I discuss the four types of nonprofit 
organizations that do invest considerable time and resources in policy advocacy.  These nonprofit 
                                                          
46
 See the following link for the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), run by the 
Urban Institute, for all 501(c) subsection organizations: 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/showOrgsByCategory.php?group= subsection&code= 
(accessed 15 July, 2012). 
47
 See the IRS’s website “Guidance for IRC 501(c)(29) Qualified Nonprofit Health Insurance 





interest groups file under subsections (c)(3) through (6).
48
  I start in this section of the chapter 
with a brief discussion of the two types of economic-based nonprofit interest groups: labor 
organizations and business associations.  These are the two types of membership associations 
that face the fewest mobilizing and policy barriers in pursing their policy goals.   
Incorporated labor unions file under subsection 501(c)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code 
(IRC).
49
  I specify “incorporated” because many smaller unions are not incorporated at all (Kagel 
1962).  This subsection of the tax code was first created by the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 
1909 (Reilly, Hull, and Allen 2003a, 3).  While some individuals refer to all labor organizations 
that file under subsection 501(c)(5) as “labor unions,” they are not technically the same thing.  
All incorporated labor unions file under the section, but not all 501(c)(5) “labor organizations” 
are labor unions.  Labor union is actually a narrower term.  Subsection 501(c)(5) covers any 
“association of workers who have combined to protect or promote the interests of the members 
by bargaining collectively with their employers to secure better working conditions, wages, and 
similar benefits” (p. 4).  Labor groups have retained this tax-exempt status without interruption 
since Congress first provided it to them in the early 1900s; however, President Eisenhower tried 
to get Congress to passed legislation in 1958 and 1959 that would empower the Secretary of 
Labor to remove specific groups’ exemption status (Albert and Hansell 1962, 137).  The 
legislation did not pass, and no such similar legislation has been pursued since. 
                                                          
48
 There is a fifth type of nonprofit, 527 organizations, discussed in the previous chapter, which 
also attempt to influence policy.  These groups file in a different section of the tax code.  Some 
527s do operate as stand-alone organizations.  The 527s included in this study, however, are used 
as electioneering arms of 501(c) organizations. 
49
 All of the 501(c)(5)s in my study are labor groups, but this section actually also covers certain 
types of agricultural and horticultural groups that are not labor related (Reilly, Hull, and Allen 
2003a, 1).  These types of agricultural groups should not be confused with business agricultural 
organizations such as the National Association of Wheat Growers, which are business 





Subsection 501(c)(6) is designated for business leagues, chambers of commerce, real 
estate boards, and boards of trade.
50
  This tax-exempt subsection was first enacted as part of the 
Tariff Act of 1913.  Although there is no legislative comment as to why Congress created the 
subsection, the IRS contents it was passed in response to a request from the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce for the creation of a nonprofit status for “commercial organizations” (Reilly, Hull, 
and Allen 2003b, 12).  The IRC defines organizations filing in this subsection (most commonly 
referred to as business and trade associations) as groups “of persons having a common business 
interest, whose purpose is to promote the common business interest and not to engage in a 
regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit.  [Business and trade association] 
activities are directed to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines of business 
rather than the performance of particular services for individual persons” (p. 3).  Not 
surprisingly, business and trade associations are among the most well-funded nonprofit 
organizations.  According to the Center for Charitable Statistics, there were more than 35,000 




Although donations to labor organizations and business associations are not tax 
deductible, these groups do not pay federal taxes on any profits they do earn.  Because they are 
tax exempt, these groups are subject to some limitations to their policy advocacy activities.  The 
IRS’s rules for political activities for both labor and business organizations are roughly the same.  
                                                          
50
 Interesting side note, the National Football League (i.e., the NFL) also files under subsection 
501(c)(6).  Despite the fact that the NLF generated $7.8 billion in revenue with overall operating 
income of roughly $1 billion in 2010, the league is a nonprofit that pays no taxes on its earned 
income (Maul 2011).  
51
 See NCCS’s “Organizations by IRS Subsection”: 
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/showOrgsByCategory.php?group=subsection&code= 





They are permitted to direct as much of their resources as they want to lobbying.  They are also 
able to engage in some partisan electoral activities.  They can start separate segregated fund 
(SSF) PACs as a means to donate to candidates (Caron and Dessingue 1985, 187).  They can 
endorse a candidate for office, although the majority do not.
52
  The IRS requires that a group’s 
partisan electioneering expenditures be reported (Reid 2006, 359).  These “campaign 
intervention” activities are only supposed to constitute a minority of a group’s expenses.  A 
group deemed as having the primary objective of influencing elections can, at least in theory, 
have its tax status revoked (Kingsly and Pomeranz 2005, 61).  While unions and business 
associations have not typically been in danger of exceeding the permissible limits of 
electioneering activities, many critics of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s increased political 
activities in recent years have argued that the group is violating IRS electioneering rules (Lipton, 
McIntire, and Van Natta 2010).  
Nonprofit Causes  
 Ask the average American to name an interest group, and he or she will probably name a 
nonprofit association, most likely one that advocates for public causes.
53
  Believe it or not, this is 
fairly close to how sociologists (e.g., Knoke 1990; Strolovitch 2006) define interest groups.  
                                                          
52
 Technically, the IRS only permits “express advocacy communications” (i.e.., calls for the 
election or defeat of specific candidates) for these groups to their own membership (Reid 2006, 
359).  Business associations and labor unions have frequently made endorsing statements to 
members of the general public, however, and, to my knowledge, no group has ever been 
reprimanded by the IRS for doing so.   
53
 This statement is based on personal observation and an analysis of 123 hand-written responses 
of students to the statement “Name an interest group,” which was asked of students in two 
American National Government classes at the University of Arkansas in April 2012.  Excluding 
“I don’t know” responses, the most common response was the National Rifle Association 
(NRA).  Every student who provided the name of a group wrote the name of a voluntary 
membership association such as the NRA or PETA.  There were zero responses to mention 
institutions such as Wal-Mart or, for that matter, business nonprofit associations such as the U.S. 





While political scientists have typically included institutions in their interest group studies, 
sociologists have usually studied groups as movements into which individuals have voluntary 
joined (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 25-27).  The sociological definition more closely 
resembles the typical American concept of an “interest group” because it more accurately 
represents the normal citizen’s experience with groups.  Wal-Mart undoubtedly behaves like an 
interest group, spending millions more on lobbying and electioneering every year than groups 
like the Sierra Club.  Yet, the vast majority of citizens come into contact with Wal-Mart not as an 
interest group, but as a retail outlet where they shop or work.  This logic similarly applies to 
business and professional trade associations.  Business associations, such as the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers, have primarily institutional 
memberships; thus, they do not organize mass membership drives aimed at your typical citizen.  
Professional associations like the American Medical Association or American Dental 
Association do have individual members, but most individuals join and come into contact with 
the group for reasons other than influencing public policy.  Many of these groups retain power 
over who can practice a given profession by controlling access to essentials such as malpractice 
insurance or state-level professional licenses.  For these groups, policy influence is often a “by-
product” of their existence (Olson 1965, 132-66).  More doctors join the AMA, for example, to 




 The population of organizations advocating for nonprofit causes (i.e., public interest and 
charitable groups) is growing (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 101; Ben-Ner 1994; Jenkins 2006; 
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 Olson (1965, 139) cites one study of the AMA for this finding.  He mentions one doctor who 
dropped his membership.  The doctor not only lost his malpractice insurance, but he also lost the 





King and Walker 1991; Houck 2003; Strolovitch 2006).  What this means for nonprofits and 
nonprofit advocacy specifically is unclear.  Dahl (1994) argues that an overload caused by 
nonprofit advocates largely promoting single-issue positions and direct democracy measures 
(e.g., referendums) reduces the power of governmental institutions.
55
  Walker (1991) believes the 
increasing number of citizens groups will serve as a check on the upper-class bias within the 
system.  Baumgartner et al. (2009, 254), however, contend that most newly formed groups with 
public missions, even those on the left, seem to represent causes important to upper class 
individuals.  Strolovitch (2006) likewise concludes that many public interest groups representing 
marginalized populations place the most focus on issues important to their most advantaged 
populations, e.g., minority rights groups advocating for minority business owners.   
Public Interests and “Social Welfare” 
 Public interest organizations were, until recently, the forgotten stepchildren of the 
nonprofit interest group community.  They undoubtedly advocate for nonprofit profit causes, but 
most scholars do not consider them to be part of the nonprofit community (e.g., Berry and Arons 
2003; Berry 2005 and 2006; Child and Gronbjerg 2007), although some do (Jenkins 2002, 308; 
Salamon 2002, 7).  This may be due to the fact that a number of public interest groups are highly 
ideological, single-issue organizations (e.g., Gun Owners of America, the National Right to Life 
Committee, NARAL Pro-choice America), whose reputations are frowned upon in certain 
circles. Academic attention to public interest groups, however, is guaranteed to increase in the 
coming years, as these groups will be most affected by recent policies proposed to mitigate the 
impact of the Citizens United v. FEC (2010) ruling.   
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 Dahl (1994), to be fair, sees a growth of interest groups as natural in a system of weak political 





 Public interest groups perform the majority of their work under a 501(c)(4) tax status.  I 
will explain the qualification of “majority” in a later section.  This section of the tax code, 
created at the same time 501(c)(6) was established, is reserved for “social welfare” 
organizations.
56
  If one were to wonder what “social welfare” means, the IRS would be able to 
provide very little in the way of assistance.  Social welfare groups are supposed to “promote the 
common good,” but, of course, such a vague phrase easily covers both the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) and the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence.  The truth is even the IRS 
is not entirely sure what “social welfare” means.  As the agency puts it:  
Obviously the language of both the statute and the regulations comprehends a 
very broad category of organizations…  Although the [IRS] has been making an 
effort to refine and clarify this area, IRC 501(c)(4) remains in some degree a 
catch-all for presumptively beneficial non-profit organizations that resist 
classification under the other exempting provisions of the Code.  Unfortunately, 
this condition exists because “social welfare” is inherently an abstruse concept 
that continues to defy precise definition (Reilly, Hull, and Allen 2003c, 3).   
 
 Subsection 501(c)(4) could probably best be described as the home for groups with broad 
policy-based missions.  Ideological and single-issue groups file under this subsection.  These 
groups advocate for everything from protection of the environment to property rights, civil 
liberties to national security, and legalized pot to family values.  A few 501(c)(4)s with small 
government missions such as the Club for Growth and National Taxpayers Union even receive a 
great deal of support from organized business.  Whatever a social welfare organization is, there 
certainly are a lot of them.  As of 2002, the IRS reports more than 121,000 organizations have 
                                                          
56
 I do not use the term “social welfare” to describe the public interest groups in my study 
because these groups cannot be defined solely on their 501(c)(4) status.  Most large public 
interest organizations have both a 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(3) tax-exempt arm, as do many large 
charitable groups interested in public policy.  I discuss making a distinction between these 
groups in greater detail in the methods chapter.  In the final section of this chapter, I discuss how 





filed under subsection 501(c)(4), making it the second largest subsection in the tax code in terms 
of number of organizations (Reilly, Hull, and Allen 2003c, 1).   
 IRS advocacy rules for 501(c)(4)s are the same as for labor and business associations.  
These groups can engage in as much lobbying as they wish.  They also follow the same 
electioneering rules as labor and business associations, which permit the performance of some 
partisan electoral activities (Kingsly and Pomeranz 2005).  Unlike labor and business groups, 
however, 501(c)(4)s have more often run afoul of the IRS’s electioneering rules.  Labor unions 
and business associations are typically not in danger of exceeding the IRS’s limits for political 
activities because so much of their work inherently goes to supporting their membership.  Labor 
unions engage in collective bargaining, set up union halls, and provide legal support for their 
members.  Business and professional trade associations provide trade statistics, produce widely 
read trade publications and journals, and organize business expos and occupational conferences.  
Public interest organizations do not represent specific occupations or sectors of the economy.  
Instead, their memberships often consist of individuals from broad swaths of society, many of 
whom have nothing more in common than a very general opinion as to what should be the 
purpose of government.  For many broad public interest groups, the most efficient method of 
pursing general policy goals such as “smaller government” or “protect the environment” is not 
through lobbying on specific legislation but electioneering.  Since the IRS’s limit on campaign 
intervention is based on a percent of the group’s overall expenditures, not a total amount spent, 
public interest groups, even if they spend substantially less overall on elections than labor unions 
and business associations, are more in danger of violating the agency’s electioneering rules.   
 In fairness, history is not exactly littered with cases of 501(c)(4)s that provoked the ire of 





should be used sparingly.  It, therefore, prefers to grant provisional tax-exempt status and spend 
years processing applications for organizations that seem to have primarily electoral goals (Race 
1997, 1940).  In 1997, for example, the IRS denied an application for 501(c)(4) status to an 
organization called Empower America.  In its denial letter, the IRS asserted that the group was 
purely partisan, citing the fact that it was organized by several prominent Republicans and 
sought to advance a “conservative reform agenda.”  Thus, the organization was deemed to be 
operating for the “private benefit” of electing Republicans, not for the promotion of a common 
good (Kingsly and Pomeranz 2005, 79-80).   
 No case better illustrates the IRS’s wait and see attitude on granting 501(c)(4) status than 
its review of the Christian Coalition’s political activities.  The Christian Coalition operated under 
a provisional 501(c)(4) status for 10 years before its application was formally denied in 1999.  
By the time of the IRS’s decision, however, the organization had already successfully established 
several 501(c)(4) state chapters, including the Christian Coalition of Texas, which was 
established as the new national chapter and soon housed the majority of the group’s operations 
(Edsall and Rosin 1999).  The continuance of the Coalition’s political activities, primarily its 
distribution of millions of scorecards to churches, caused the group’s new tax-exempt status to 
also come under review.
57
  In 2005, the Coalition finally reached an agreement with the IRS that 
allows the organization to operate as a 501(c)(4).  Although the group eventually secured tax-
exempt status, the long-running battle with the IRS has taken a toll.  By 2004, the once-mighty 
Coalition, with millions of members in the 1990s, was more than $2 million in debt.  Today, it 
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 The issuing of scorecards by nonprofits does not usually get an organization in trouble with the 
IRS.  However, the Christian Coalition’s scorecards, with descriptions of legislators as 
“supporting abortion on demand,” where deemed misleading.  Furthermore, the group was 
extremely aggressive in the way it distributed its ratings.  Both of these facts taken together led 
regulators to conclude the group primarily existed to elect socially conservative Republicans to 





operates out of a small office in Charleston, South Carolina, with its only physical presence in 
Washington, DC being a post office box (Cooperman and Edsall 2006).   
 Nonprofits filing under 501(c) subsections, especially 501(c)(4)s, will likely face 
increased scrutiny for electioneering following Citizens United v. FEC (2010).  The Citizens 
United ruling frees nonprofits to expressly advocate in favor or opposition of the election of 
candidates for office.  In the wake of the ruling, pressure has built for the IRS to more 
aggressively enforce its electioneering policies, particularly on 501(c)(4)s (Weisman 2012a).  In 
March 2012, Senate Democrats notified the IRS that they want the agency to ensure that tax-
exempt groups devote less than half of their expenses to campaign intervention or that they 
would pass legislation forcing the agency to do so (ibid.).   
 While the IRS seemingly has not increased its enforcement of its electioneering limits for 
nonprofits, it has intensified its enforcement of the gift tax for donors to overtly political groups 
(Becker 2011).  Donors who contribute more than $13,000 per year to a nonprofit under 
subsections 501(c)(4), (c)(5) and (c)(6) are subject to a gift tax of up to 35 percent.  Although 
administration of the gift tax was limited before Citizens United, the agency has increased 
enforcement against donors to 501(c)(4)s since the 2010 election (ibid.).   
 Even more regulations may be coming.  Because 501(c) organizations are under no 
obligation to disclose the names of their donors (unlike FEC-regulated institutions, such as 
PACs), they have always been a popular option for donors wishing to influence elections but 
remain anonymous (Weissman and Ryan 2007, 6-7).  In June 2010, however, the House of 
Representatives passed the Disclose Act,
58
 which would require nonprofits that spend on partisan 
electioneering to disclose the names of their donors to the FEC (A Vote for Disclosure 2010; 
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Herszenhorn 2010a).  Although a filibuster killed the bill’s chance of passing the Senate and, 
consequently, of becoming law during the 111
th
 Congress (Herszenhorn 2010b), it continues to 
be pursued by legislators (Weisman 2012b).  The probability is high that the Disclose Act will 
become law if Democrats retain the White House and pick up both houses of Congress in the 
2012 elections.  
Charitable Advocacy  
 The most common nonprofit is a 501(c)(3) (Ben-Ner 1994).  This section of the tax code 
is for organizations with “religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes” (Berry 2006, 239).   Although these organizations are known as 
“charitable nonprofits,” the vast majority do not engage in charitable activities (Ben-Ner 1994, 
731-62).  In this study, however, I focus on charitable groups, which I define as organizations 
that provide or advocate for the provision of some type of social service.
59
  If business groups are 
over represented in the pressure system, then charitable groups represent the total opposite end of 
the spectrum.  Although one recent count placed the number of charitable organizations at more 
than 1 million (Houck 2003, 2), collectively they spent a mere $43,214,430 on lobbying in 
Washington, D.C. in 2010 (the last year included in this study).  By comparison, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce alone spent $157,187,500 on lobbying during the same period.
60
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 As stated earlier, I provide a more detailed discussion of how I define “public interest” versus 
“charitable” groups in the methods chapter, where I discuss operationalizing my independent 
variables.  Since many groups utilize multiple tax-exempt statuses, it is difficult to distinguish a 
public interest or charitable group based only on the subsection in which they file, as these 
groups often share the same tax statuses.  Therefore, I define groups based on the “policy 
typology” (Lowi 1972; Tatalovich and Daynes 2005) in which issues important to them are 
placed.   
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 Studies have almost uniformly concluded that many, if not most, charitable groups avoid 
formal advocacy.  Many even consider lobbying a “dirty word” (Ezell 2010).  One study of 
virtually all small and mid-sized 501(c)(3)s in the country found that only 1.9 percent reported 
lobbying on their Form 990s (Reid 2006, 354-55).
61
  Boris and Krehely (2002) concluded that 
less than 3 percent of charitable-service nonprofits lobby per year.  Similar discoveries have been 
made with studies of charitable lobbying at the state level.  Suárez (2009) found that only three 
of 200 randomly selected charitable groups in the San Francisco Bay area reported lobbying on 
their Form 990 and only 17 percent encouraged political participation to their membership or the 
public.  Child and Gronbjerg (2007) noted a general reluctance of charitable groups to engage in 
formalized advocacy in Indiana.   
 There is some evidence to suggest that not all organizations with missions falling under 
section 501(c)(3) avoid formal advocacy.  Groups with environmental,
62
 civil rights, and health 
missions are believed to lobby more than other charitable groups (Child and Gronbjerg 2007; 
Suárez and Hwang 2007).  Politicians have often complained that providing public funds can 
indirectly subsidize lobbying for charitable groups; however, Leech (2006) found that groups 
receiving government funding are no more likely to lobby.   
 Explanations for the lack of advocacy on the part of charitable groups vary.  Some 
authors cite a lack of funding (Reid 2006, 355).  Others point to intimidation by conservative 
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 A Form 990 is the annual form tax exempt organizations must complete and turn into the IRS.  
The study was limited to 501(c)(3)s with budgets of $25,000 or more.   
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 Not all organizations with environmental missions can fairly be categorized as “charitable” 
groups.  All of the environmental groups in this study are classified as public interest groups, as 
the majority of their activities include advocating for regulatory causes such as clean air.  Some 
environmental groups, however, provide social services.  I ran a small organization called 
Friends of the Tuskegee National Forest, which educated children in Tuskegee, Alabama about 
their community’s national forest.  Our most popular program was to organized field trips for to 





politicians who view charitable missions as too liberal (Ainsworth 2002, 54-55; Berry 2006, 248-
249); although even pro-business 501(c)(3)s have faced recent criticism for their advocacy 
activities (McIntire 2012).  The most frequently cited cause for the phenomenon is social service 
practitioners’ lack of understanding of IRS rules on lobbying for Section 501(c)(3) 
organizations.
63
  IRS lobbying restrictions for 501(c)(3)s date back to 1919 (Berry and Arons 
2003, 51).  As an inducement to donate to worthy causes, these 501(c)(3)s are able to offer tax 
deductions to their donors (Berry 2005, 569).  Donations to a 501(c)(4)s, (c)(5)s, or (c)(6)s are 
not tax deductible.
64
  Also unlike the other groups discussed in this chapter, 501(c)(3)s are 
exempt from the gift tax (Reid 2006, 256).  Tax deductibility for donors opens these groups up to 
vastly more sources of income, especially grants from foundations and governments.  The 
federal government, however, equates tax deductibility for donations to public subsidization.  
For this reason, 501(c)(3)s are not allowed to engage in a “substantial” amount of lobbying or 
grassroots advocacy, although they are allowed to engage in some.   
What constitutes “substantial” is far from clear.  The IRS refuses to provide an exact 
definition, under the rationale that providing a precise definition would encourage groups to 
lobby to their permissible limit (Berry 2006, 240).  In other words, the ambiguity, it is believed, 
discourages activism.  There is an alternative to ambiguity.  By using Section 501(h) and filling 
out a form 5768, public charities are allowed to direct a portion of their tax deductible donations 
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discussed, and better understood, national lobbying policies such as the Lobbying Disclosure Act 
of 1995.   
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 These organizations are still considered nonprofits, however, because they are exempt from 
federal income taxes and have volunteer boards of directors, unlike for-profit corporations.  
There are only two types of groups that can offer deductibility for donations: 501(c)(3)s and 
501(c)(19)s, which is reserved for veteran groups.  See the IRS’s website for more discussion: 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p557/ch04.html#en_US_2011_publink1000200395 (accessed 19 





to lobbying.  According to this so-called “H-elector” rule, there are two types of lobbying: direct 
lobbying (the formal type examined in this study) and grassroots lobbying (attempts to spur 
public action on a legislative issue). A group is involved with direct lobbying when an employee 
or someone paid to represent the group “communicates with a member or employee of a 
legislative body and one of the purposes is influencing legislation” (Nix 1978, 419).
65
  Since the 
H-elector rule defines lobbying rather narrowly and the expenditure limits are fairly generous, it 
is rather difficult for an organization to exceed the ceilings. Yet, some research has suggested 
that the H-elector option has been underutilized (Berry 2006). 
The IRS has not been hesitant to enforce its lobbying rules.  The most notorious 
application of them came in June 1966 after the Sierra Club, which at the time was a registered 
501(c)(3), ran full-page ads in the New York Times and Washington Post in opposition to a bill in 
Congress.  The bill would have authorized the building of two hydroelectric dams in Colorado.  
The ad urged readers to ask members of the Colorado congressional delegation to oppose the 
project.  Within days of the ad’s appearance, the IRS suspended the group’s tax status, which 
was ultimately revoked after a quick investigation (Boroad 1967).  Charitable advocacy 
researchers still cite the Sierra Club incident as an example of intimidation of nonprofit groups 
(Berry and Arons 2003, 72-79).  Since the incident, the IRS’s lobbying provisions have resulted 
in some fairly nasty legal battles, including one case, Reagan v. Taxation without Representation 
(1983), that made it to the Supreme Court (Reid 2006, 354).
66
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 The permissible level of direct lobbying is 20 percent of the first $500,000 of the 
organization’s “exempt purpose expenditures” for a year. The permissible percentage drops 5 
percent for each additional $500,000. The group may spend 15 percent for the second $500,000, 
10 percent for the third, and 5 percent for anything above the third (Nix 1978, 408). 
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The lessons of the Sierra Club incident and subsequent legal battles may have been 
learned a little too well.  Although section 501(c)(3) organizations are allowed to lobby, it 
appears that many charitable service practitioners believe they cannot.  The findings from the 
Strengthening Nonprofit Advocacy Project (SNAP), the most wide-ranging study on IRS rules 
for 501(c)(3) lobbying, makes a compelling case that ignorance of IRS rules may very well be 
the primary reason for the underrepresentation of charitable groups in the policymaking process.  
SNAP was a mixed methods study consisting of more than 1,700 survey responses, 45 in-depth 
interviews with executive directors, and 17 focus groups with executive directors and board 
members from around the country.  The study was designed to gauge participants’ knowledge of 
advocacy rules.  The overall performance by subjects was less than great.  Possibly the most 
troubling finding was that only slightly more than half, 54 percent, knew they are allowed to take 
stands on legislation in Congress or state legislatures.
67
  “We’re not allowed to lobby.  We’re not 
allowed to influence public policy” claimed one participant (Berry and Arons 2003, 59-60).   
 While other 501(c) groups face some electioneering restrictions, 501(c)(3)s are 
completely banned from engaging in partisan political activities.  The IRS’s electioneering ban 
forbids 501(c)(3)s from any intervention in political campaigns on behalf of a candidate for 
public office (Caron and Dessingue 1985, 173).
68
   This ban, proposed by then-Senator Lyndon 
Johnson (D-TX), was added to the IRC in 1954 (De Leon 2004, 695).  The punishment for 
engaging in partisan electoral activities is a revocation of a group’s 501(c)(3) status.  Since 
donations to 501(c)(3)s are tax deductible, this absolute prohibition is reasoned as necessary to 
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oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate.  Of course groups are prohibited 






avoid taxpayer subsidized electioneering (Kingsley and Pomeranz 2005, 64).  The IRS has 
frequently enforced the 501(c)(3) electioneering ban and while it has been challenged on a 
number of occasions the IRS usually wins, e.g., Association of the Bar of the City of New York v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1988) and American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner 
(1989).   
The IRS’s ban against partisan electioneering by 501(c)(3)s has not been nearly as 
controversial as its lobbying rules, but many evangelical Christians and socially conservative 
politicians have not been happy with it (De Leon 2004).  Churches have technically been covered 
by the ban for many years, but their election-related activities were mostly ignored until the early 
1990s (Simon, Dale, and Chisolm 2006, 288).  There has, however, been a rather obvious 
increase of enforcement against churches in recent years (ibid.).  In 2004, for example, the Bush 
campaign requested religious supporters nationwide to turn over church directories to the 
campaign and to advocate on behalf of the President’s reelection to their fellow parishioners 
(Ryan 2007, 74).  The request provoked a number of complaints to the IRS, who responded by 
sending letters to the committees for both the Democratic and Republican parties reminding 
them of the IRS’s electioneering policy for fully tax-exempt groups (p. 75).    
Some Christian conservatives have argued that the ban infringes on churches free speech 
rights.  Yet, the IRS has won the majority First Amendment constitutional challenges to the ban, 
most notably in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti (2000) (Kingsly and Pomeranz 2005, 65-71).  
Additionally, there is no evidence that the IRS has unfairly targeted religious institutions with its 
electioneering ban.  Past inquiries into the IRS’s investigations of groups suspected of violating 
the ban have revealed that vast majority are not religious institutions (Ryan 2007, 75).  A three-





shown any political bias in its audits of 501(c)(3)s (Dessingue 2001, 924-25).  Still, criticisms of 
the IRS’s enforcement of its electioneering ban against churches persist.  In 2002, the House of 
Representatives voted on the Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act (HR 2357), 
which would have exempted churches from the ban.  While the act did not pass, its supporters 
have continued to push the issue (De Leon 2004, 692-93).   
 “Complex Organizational Structures” and the Rise of Super PACs 
 Only within recent years have authors begun to notice how advocacy rules have 
incentivized nonprofit interest groups to develop increasingly complex combinations of tax-
exempt statuses in order to maximize their impact on public policy.  Charitable groups in 
particular have been forced to be creative in how they navigate IRS regulations.  Some social 
service groups have adapted their missions to note their dual roles as charitable service providers 
and policy advocates.  These appropriately named “hybrid organizations” (Minkoff 2002) are 
involved with most types of charitable services.  Marwell (2004), for example, noted the rise of 
“machine politics” community based organizations (CBOs), which distribute community 
services and create reliable voting blocs to elect officials who support the group’s mission.  
Smith and Lipsky (1993) similarly discussed “upstart” organizations, which develop from the 
contracting out of social service delivery by governments and then play an active role in 
advocating for the continued and increased funding of programs.    
 Today, many of Minkoff’s (2002) dual-role hybrids have formed what some authors refer 
to as “complex organizational structures” (Kerlin and Reid 2009; Boris and Kerhely 2002; Reid 
2001), when a group juggles multiple tax-exempt statuses in order to expand its advocacy 
activities.  This practice started shortly after the Sierra Club’s 501(c)(3) status was revoked in 





Planned Parenthood and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) to begin operating under both 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) statuses, delegating specific 
duties to the appropriate wing (Kern 1967).  While these complex organizational structures were 
originally formed to bypass lobbying restrictions, they have been useful for electioneering 
purposes as well (Reid and Kerlin 2003; Reid 2006, 363).  A 501(c)(3) cannot form a SSF PAC, 
but a 501(c)(4) can.  Thus, a group with multiple statuses can use a 501(c)(3) for fundraising and 
most managerial responsibilities and delegate all advocacy (lobbying and administration of its 
PAC) to its 501(c)(4).  The courts endorsed the use of complex organizational structures as a 
solution to the 501(c)(3)-advocacy dilemma in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti (2000) (Simon, 
Dale, and Chisolm 2006, 285).  
 These complex structures, while providing some advantages, are far from a perfect 
solution for charitable groups looking to advocate.  Salamon (2002, 39) laments that many 
charitable groups have been transformed into “complex holding companies,” significantly 
complicating their managerial tasks.  These complex arrangements are unlikely to be an option 
for smaller groups serving lower-income populations (Boris and Kerhely 2002).  Reid (2001) 
similarly states that the combination of establishing affiliated 501(c)(4)s and SSF PACs is 
impractical for the majority of social service organizations that are greatly affected by legislative 
policy.  Service delivery requires tremendous investments in infrastructure and highly trained 
staff.  Consequently, the additional resources and fundraising required to develop additional tax-
exempt organizations is usually out of reach.   
 The convergence of tax and federal election policies within the last decide has served to 
only further complicate the picture.  Following the implementation of Bipartisan Campaign 





(particularly liberal 501[c][4]s and labor unions) were using PACs to contribute to candidates 
and affiliated 527s to shape public opinion with independent campaign interventions.  From the 
years 2004 (the first year under BCRA) to 2009, groups using affiliated 527s had to abide by the 
issue ad distinction laid out by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo (1976).
69
  It is important to 
note here that all FEC-regulated entities (e.g., PACs, party committees, and candidate 
committees) are technically 527s.  What separated traditional FEC entities such as PACs from 
527s such as Swift Boat Veterans for Truth is that the latter were independent from candidates 
and campaigns.  Therefore, they did not have to abide by the contribution limits placed on FEC 
entities like PACs.
 70
  However, these so-called 527s organizations could not make contributions 
directly to candidates and, more importantly, could not purchase express advocacy 
communications because such types of ads were deemed to be contributions.  In February 2008, 
an unincorporated “astroturf” organization called Speechnow.org (started by the conservative 
Club for Growth), challenged the FEC’s requirement that 527s have to (a) register with the FEC 
to disclose their donors and (b) abide by contribution limits for PACs if the group purchases 
“express advocacy” communications.
71
   
 In January 2010 in the case Citizens United v. FEC, however, the Supreme Court 
eliminated the need for the issue ad distinction by stating that organizations could use their 
general treasury funds to purchase ads calling for the direct election or defeat of candidates.  This 
greatly affected Speechnow.org’s case.  Shortly after the Citizens United ruling, the D.C. Circuit 
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 See the electioneering section of the last chapter for more explanation of issues versus express 
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 PACs are unable to raise money from institutions (i.e., incorporated entities or unions) and 
cannot raise more than $5,000 per year from individuals.   
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 You can review the facts of the Speechnow.org v. FEC case at the “Ongoing Litigation” 
section of the FEC’s website: http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/speechnow.shtml (accessed July 





Court of Appeals handed Speechnow.org a partial victory in its ongoing battle with the FEC.  
The court ruled that Speechnow.org did have to comply with the FEC’s registration requirement.  
However, applying the Citizens United precedent, the court ruled the group could purchase 
express advocacy communications – provided it did not make contributions directly to candidate 
committees, PACs, and party committees (Liptak 2010).
72
  This directly led to the FEC 
developing independent expenditure-only committees, or, what the press has not-so-eloquently 
dubbed, “super PACs.”   
  Super PACs are FEC-regulated bodies.  They do have to register with the FEC and do 
have to disclose their donors.  Yet, unlike candidate committees, party committees, and 
traditional PACs, they do not have to abide by contribution limits.  Contributions to them are not 
capped, and they can raise contributions from businesses, unions, and nonprofits.
73
  Super PACs 
have become a popular vehicle for influencing elections (Shear and Willis 2012), but their 
disclosure requirements have made some individuals and businesses leery of contributing 
directly to them.  In July 2010, for example, Target and Best Buy came under intense criticism 
from liberal and gay rights groups for their contributions to MN Forward, a super PAC that 
supported some socially conservative Republican candidates (Eggen 2010).  Since nonprofits 
under 501(c) subsections are not required to disclose their donors, many companies and 
individuals wishing to remain anonymous have given to traditional nonprofits (Lipton, McIntire, 
and Van Natta 2010).  But some activists have figured out the benefit of coupling the anonymity 
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advantages of 501(c)s with the unlimited amount of partisan electioneering in which super PACs 
are allowed to engage.  These activists have used nonprofits through which to funnel donations 
to super PACs (Glaun 2012; Whose Welfare? 2012).  Karl Rove, in particular, has mastered the 
management of these new complex organizational structures by launching his American 
Crossroads super PAC and Crossroads GPS 501(c)(4) (Cook 2011; Whose Welfare? 2012).   
 Although super PACs are not included in my study, their development is a definite 
indicator that groups will use increasingly complex networks of tax exempt entities to influence 
public policy.   
 Conclusions on Advocacy by Nonprofits and Nonprofit Advocacy 
 The literature on nonprofits as interest groups has grown from virtually nonexistent 
before last decade to one of the most rapidly growing topics in the fields of public policy and 
political science.  Authors in this area of study have ranged from attorneys (e.g., Briffault 2005), 
practitioners (e.g., Reid 2001 and 2006), and social scientists (e.g., Strolovitch 2006; Berry 2005 
and 2006).  Research institutions such as the Urban Institute, the Aspen Institute, and the 
Campaign Finance Institute have even turned out entire volumes discussing nonprofits involved 
in policy advocacy (e.g., De Vita and Mosher-Williams 2001; Bass et al. 2007; Malbin 2006).  In 
this chapter, I discuss the types of tax-exempt organizations that makeup the nonprofit interest 
group landscape.  It is particularly important to note that not all nonprofit interest groups 
advocate for nonprofit causes, a fact that even some scholars have overlooked or only passingly 
referenced (e.g., Leech 2006; Berry 2006, 254-55).  In addition to advocacy policies such as the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, which are 
applied to all interest groups, nonprofit organizations face additional advocacy restrictions 





for public causes, which file under either 501(c)(4) or 501(c)(3) of the IRC.  In an effort to 
maximize their policy impact while navigating IRS and traditional advocacy rules, many 
nonprofits have taken to forming “complex organization structures” (Kerlin and Reid 2009; 
Boris and Kerhely 2002; Reid 2001), allowing groups to perform various activities under 
different tax-exempt statuses that together makeup the same organization.  While developing 
multiple tax-exempt statuses is likely an effective method of achieving advocacy goals, it 
appears to be an option out of reach for smaller groups pursuing public causes (Reid 2001).   
 Aside from the typical interest group activities of lobbying and electioneering, nonprofit 
membership associations engage in an assortment of activities in which institutional interest 
groups do not.  Among the most important of activities exclusive to nonprofit membership 
associations is informing members in the general public about policy developments.  In the 
following chapter, I discuss the use of legislator ratings, aka “scorecards,” as a common way 
groups inform their members about public policy.  Scorecards, once embraced in social science 
research, have declined in popularity with academics in recent years.  Yet, I explain how they 
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IV. SCORECARDS AND ACADEMIA 
Introduction 
Not long ago, interest group ratings were a popular tool for political scientists. As an 
easily available source of data on legislators’ preferences, voting, and ideology, it makes sense 
that academics were drawn to these congressional “scorecards,” during the 1970s, 1980s and 
early 1990s (e.g., Markus 1974; Saltzman 1987; Grenzke 1989; Krehbiel 1990).  After much 
examination, however, the majority of authors concluded that scorecards hold little value for 
empirical analysis (Hall and Grofman 1990; Snyder 1992; Jackson and Kingdon 1992; 
Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999; Brunell et al. 1999).  The critical reviews, plus the 
development of more sophisticated substitutes such as spatial modeling (Poole and Rosenthal 
1997), resulted in a loss of popularity of scorecards in the last decade, although some researchers 
have used them in ways that ignore or adjust the legislator ratings as part of a broader method of 
evaluating legislative activity (e.g., Nelson 2002; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002).  
I argue that scorecard ratings still hold tremendous potential for political and policy 
researchers.  Instead of using cards to make inferences about legislators, however, I reverse the 
equation and contend that scorecards can tell us a great deal about the groups that issue ratings.  
My specific purpose is to use individual legislator ratings to develop a measure of “legislator 
satisfaction.”  When a group issues a scorecard, it indicates what topics during a congressional 
term are important to it and which legislators are in agreement with the group.   
An individual legislator’s rating issued by a single group is of little help when making 
generalizations.  But many types of organizations, focusing on a wide variety of issues, have 
used scorecards over the last couple of decades.  Prior studies (e.g., Snyder 1992; Groseclose, 





ideological groups such as the American Conservative Union (ACU) and Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA).  In this study, I employ 105,893 ratings of individual U.S. senators 
issued by 249 groups over the years 1999 to 2010.   I classify the card-issuing groups based on 
their missions and tax statuses to produce four types of organizations: business and professional 
associations, labor unions, charitable organizations, and public interests groups.  I then aggregate 
the scores for individual groups and for the entire classification in which the group is placed.  I 
contend that these aggregated scores create an accurate measure of legislator satisfaction.  
Groups that issue a greater number of high evaluations (e.g., 100 or A+ ratings) are more 
satisfied with senators during the congressional term than groups to produce predominately low 
ratings (i.e., 30 or below, which ranges from D+ to F on a letter scale).  Thus, aggregated scores 
can tell which groups are happy with Congress under what specific conditions.  In this chapter, I 
describe how and why scholars’ views regarding the use of scorecards have changed.  I discuss 
the critical literature on the use of scorecards and explain how these valid critiques do not apply 
to my fundamentally new method of employing legislator ratings.  Finally, I explain how I use 
scorecards to develop my measure of “legislative satisfaction.”  
A History of Scorecards 
 Interest group scorecards are certainly nothing new.  One author contends that the earliest 
scorecard was created by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1906 (Daniels 1989).  The 
individual ratings on cards are a way for membership associations to inform their members and 
likeminded individuals in the public about a legislator’s level of support for the organization’s 
mission.  These cards create “solidary incentives,” the feeling that one has contributed to a 
common cause (Wilson 1973, 46), around which groups can mobilize membership.  In the 





public causes (King and Walker 1991, 68), scorecards are also a method available to 
organizations trying to distinguish themselves.  Stories about early uses of legislator ratings 
provide support for this scorecard-mobilization theory.  Southern chapters of the League of 
Women Voters, one of the first organizations to periodically issue cards, created legislator voting 
records in the 1920s to inform sympathetic members of the public about politicians who agreed 
with the group on 100 percent of relevant votes.  Schuyler (2006, 149-51) notes that these early 
voter-education campaigns were effective as a means of distinguishing the group and mobilizing 
women’s involvement. More than 80 years later, politicians, the media, and scholars still 
recognize the effectiveness of ratings as a means of mobilizing supporters (Cochran 2003; Gold, 
Tanfani, and Mascaro 2012).   
For more than a decade, political scientists considered scorecards a valuable source of 
data on congressional voting and preference.  The first studies to use scorecards employed 
legislators’ individual ratings as a proxy measure for ideology (Kingdon 1973; Markus 1974; 
Deckard and Stanley 1974).   Not surprisingly, using ratings as a measure for ideology would 
become the most popular use for cards.  Scorecard ideological measures were used for studying 
congressional behaviors (e.g., Kau and Rubin 1979; Mitchel 1979; Kalt 1981; Peltzman 1984; 
Netter 1985; Nelson and Silberberg 1987; Lott 1987; Grenzke 1989; Cohen et al. 2000), finding 
links between legislative and constituent preferences (e.g., Schwarz and Fenmore 1977; Erikson 
and Wright 1980; Stratmann 1996; Zupan 2000b), conducting longitudinal studies monitoring 
changes in Congress and public opinion (e.g., Stimson et al. 1995; Stimson 1999), comparing the 
liberal and conservativeness of media outlets to legislators (Groseclose and Milyo 2005),  and 
performing factor analysis to estimate congressional ideological positions (e.g., Kritzer 1978; 





(Zupan 1990a; Taylor 1996).  A minority of studies used scorecard ratings for purposes other 
than developing liberal-conservative ideological measures.  Several compared the ratings of 
committee members to other legislators (Ray 1980; Weingast and Marchall 1988; Krehbiel 
1990).  Ratings were also used as a measure of influence from PAC contributions (Saltzman 
1987), although the findings were later dismissed as endogenous (Wawro 2001, 565).   
As scorecards became an increasingly popular tool for membership associations, they 
faced criticism by legislators who argued that their positions were misrepresented (Daniels 1984, 
24; Fowler 1982, 404).  Scholars also quickly noticed the lack of moderate scores on many cards 
(Fowler 1982; Snyder 1992).  A bi-modal distribution of ratings, common for cards issued by 
some groups, forms when only a small number of close votes (those with members fairly evenly 
split between yea and nay) are used to create ratings (Fowler 1982, 406).  Choosing a small 
number of close votes to compute ratings produces “artificial extremism,” the perception that 
there is a great divide between the ideological preferences of legislators (Snyder 1992).  While 
the true ideological preferences of a body of Congress may, if mapped out, produce a platakurtic 
distribution of legislators’ positions, a scorecard based on roll call votes chosen only from the 
middle of the preference distribution will almost certainly produce large standard deviations with 
bi-model distributions (p. 335).  Others pointed out that scores used as ideological measures 
cannot be compared across time and chamber, as the location of roll call votes chosen can move 
along the underlying liberal or conservative dimension (Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999).  
Imagine, for example, an ADA Senate scorecard composed during an extremely conservative 
Republican term.  If the ADA chooses primarily nay votes on extremely conservative bills (e.g., 
opposition to legislation that eliminates all federal maternity leave), then the ADA scores could 





was, as even many moderate Republicans would vote against such legislation.  If a large 
Democratic majority controlled the next term, and the ADA only chose yea votes on exceedingly 
liberal legislation, then the false-ideological depiction would be reversed.   
While scorecard ratings as a measure of preference still had their defenders (Daniels 
1984; Smith, Herrera, and Herrera 1990; Krehbiel 1994; Herrera, Epperlein, and Smith 1995), 
their popularity has declined in recent decades.  Most scholars to use scorecards in the 1990s 
seem to use them only as a means of illustrating their inaccuracy as a measure of preference 
(e.g., Hall and Grofman 1990; Snyder 1992; Jackson and Kingdon 1992; Groseclose, Levitt, and 
Snyder 1999; Brunell et al. 1999), although a number of authors used them to validate the 
development of new, more accurate measures (e.g., Hill, Hanna, and Shafqat 1997; Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997, 166-183; Poole and Rosenthal 1998).  The criticisms and development of the 
DW-NOMINATE method (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) resulted in a relatively small number of 
scorecard studies in the 2000s, at least compared to previous decades.  Recent studies have 
attempted to adjust scores to serve as appropriate measures of legislator preference (Groseclose, 
Levitt, and Snyder 1999; Dempster and Westly 2000; Herron 2000; Nelson 2002).  Others, 
however, have used the votes employed by the interest groups to generate the scores to create 
other measures.  For example, some have identified the bills monitored by groups to see if the 
organization’s vote-watching influences legislators’ behavior (Bell 2005) while others have 
simply used cards to determine what bills were important to single-issue groups (Lindaman and 
Haider-Markel 2002).   
I argue that prior research with scorecards has been limited by the narrow focus of 
scholars.  For one, the popularity of using legislator ratings as a measure of ideology has resulted 





including those to criticize the use of ratings, have relied entirely or primarily on cards issued by 
extremely liberal or conservative groups such as Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA), the 
ADA, or ACU (e.g., Kingdon 1973; Markus 1974; Schwarz and Fenmore 1977; Kau and Rubin 
1979; Mitchel 1979;  Erikson and Wright 1980; Kalt 1981; Fowler 1982; Peltzman 1984; Netter 
1985; Lott 1987;  Nelson and Silberberg 1987; Grenzke 1989; Zupan 1990a; Zupan 1990b; 
Stimson et al 1995; Stratmann 1996; Hill, Hanna, and Shafqat1997; Taylor 1996; Stimson 1999; 
Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999; Herron 2000; Dempster and Westely 2000; Cohen et al 
2000).  The notable exceptions to use a mix of organizations’ ratings include Kritzer (1978), who 
used 11 groups; Krehbiel (1990), 14 groups; Hetzner and Westin (1987), 20; Poole and 
Rosenthal (1997), 28; Poole (1981), 31; Poole and Rosenthal (1998), 59; and McKay (2008), 72.  
Furthermore, virtually every single study has used cards as a means of inferring something about 
legislators or other public officials.  The one and only exception is McKay (2008), who cleverly 
uses cards to develop an ideological score for interest groups.  Still, like other recent studies, 
McKay’s use of the scorecards is limited: she identifies which legislators voted with the 
organization’s preference 100 percent of the time,
74
 and averages those legislators’ DW-
NOMINATE scores.  Legislator ratings have thus largely been discarded as tools for political 
science research.  In the proceeding section, I explain why this should not be the case by 
illustrating how scorecards can be used to explore the dynamics of interest group satisfaction 
with Congress.   
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 This is not the same as legislators who receive perfect 100 or A+ ratings from interest groups.  
Groups employ a verity of techniques to generate their scores (see the preceding section).  
McKay (2008) disregards the group’s rating and simply uses the cards to identify which votes 





A New Use for Scorecards 
My method of examining interest groups involves aggregating the values of scorecards 
issued by nonprofit, membership associations to produce measures of legislative satisfaction.  
Scorecards assign each legislator an evaluation based on his or her positions in relation to the 
group on issues important to the organization.  Obviously, evaluation methods can differ greatly, 
and some are simply not nuanced enough for research purposes.  Vote Hemp, a pro-marijuana 
legalization group, for example, uses a three-level, ordinal evaluation system: “pro-hemp,” 
“fence sitter,” and “anti-hemp.”  The majority of groups, however, evaluate legislators the same 
way teachers evaluate student performance.  These groups assign legislators a numeric rating 
from 100-0 or a letter rating ranging from “A” to “F.”  My study is limited to organizations that 
use these two evaluation methods.   
Numeric evaluations are typically based on a legislator’s positions on roll call votes and 
cosponsorships.  The legislator’s score is calculated by counting the number of times he or she 
sides with the group divided by the overall number of votes tracked.  Table 1 illustrates the 
concept by showing that former Senator Blanche Lincoln (D-AR) voted with the League of 
Conservation Voters 13 out of the 20 votes the LCV considered important, giving her a scorecard 
rating of 65 percent.
75
  Not all organizations produce their numeric evaluations the same way, of 
course.  Some organizations weight certain bills up for votes differently.  For example, some 
groups prefer to assign “extra credit” to some votes they consider of the utmost importance.  A 
small number of organizations also count missed votes or abstentions as incorrect.  Previous 
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 Some groups stop short of computing a score and simply show the number of bills tracked and 
use some positive or negative demarcation to indicate whether the legislator agrees or disagrees 
with the group.  Most of these are charitable 501(c)(3) organizations that are afraid of being 
perceived as engaging in partisan electoral activities, which can result in the loss of their tax 





studies have excluded these groups based on the assumption that consistency among computation 
methods leads to validity for comparisons (e.g., Poole 1981, 50).  I, however, make no judgment 
on how organizations choose to weight the bills or issues of importance to them.  Instead, I 
assume that issues assigned extra weight are an accurate reflection of what is important to the 
organization, similar to when a teacher places a greater point value on test questions deemed 
more important.  I faced a similar issue when deciding whether to include groups that use as few 
as one or two bills to create their evaluations.  The number of votes used to create the scorecards 
is usually more a reflection of the congressional agenda than the organization, as groups 
naturally seek to include all votes relevant to their mission.  Still, evaluations based on only one 
or two votes present at least the possibility of skewing results.  Therefore, I do not include 
numeric evaluations based on fewer than three bills or evaluation criteria.   
 
Table 4.1: League of Conservation Voters’ 2005 Senate Scorecard for Blanche Lincoln 
  Roll-Call Votes  
Senator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Rating 
Lincoln (D), AR - + + - - - + + + + + + + + + - - - + + 65% 
 
 
Most letter grade evaluations are also based on roll call votes and cosponserships.  
Citizens for Global Solutions, for example, based its 110
th
 Senate ratings on 10 votes, each 
weighted 1 to 3 based on the level of importance to the group.
76
  Still, smaller groups with more 
narrow focuses will often include other evaluation criteria to calculate their scores.  Broad 
interest organizations such as the ADA can easily find a dozen bills during a legislative term on 
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 See Citizens for Global Solutions’ “Congressional Report Card 2010,” 





which they have an opinion.  But, obviously, fewer bills are proposed that affect groups 
representing niche interests.  Additional rating criteria used by narrow-focused organizations is 
always based on some action taken by legislators which can be interpreted as favorable or 
negative to the group’s mission.  The Armenian National Committee of America, for instance, 
based its 2010 ratings on sponsorship of S. Res. 316 and several other actions, including whether 
senators were willing to sign a letter urging President Obama to commemorate the Armenian 
Genocide.
77
  As with the numeric evaluations, letter grade evaluations are included in my study 
as long as there are at least three criteria used to create the ratings.
78
   
I have selected 105,893 individual legislator ratings of U.S. senators generated by 249 
organizations during the 106
th
 through the 111
th
 congresses for this study.  These ratings were 
pulled from multiple datasets collected from Project Vote Smart and Voter Information 
Services.
79
  Since I am using ratings based on two different grading scales, I have first created a 
point value for each possible rating on letter evaluation cards.  These new values range from 13 
for A+ ratings to 1 for F’s.  See Table 2 for the corresponding numeric value assigned to each 
rating.  I then collapse all the numeric evaluations onto the same scale.
80
  Groups also vary on 
how often they generate legislator ratings.  Roughly half of the organizations in this study issue 
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 See the following link for Senator Barbra Boxer’s rating, which is based on the group’s four 
criteria: 
http://www.anca.org/legislative_center/election_senatecard_detail.php?id=70&suffix=111 
(accessed 3-20-12).   
78
 Also bear in mind that the criteria for the rating must be based on actions as a legislator for it 
to be included in my study.  “Candidate ratings,” which are simply assumptions on how friendly 
an individual will be as a member of Congress, are not included in the study.   
79
 Both of these groups are voter information organizations that publish (on their websites) 
legislator ratings as a means of illustrating where elected officials stand on public issues.  
Although the groups do provide most of their ratings via their website, they emailed me their 
ratings in spreadsheets for convenience’s sake.   
80





cards every year, while the rest issue one card for the entire two-year congressional term.
81
  I am 
primarily concerned with interest groups’ satisfaction with an entire legislative term.  Therefore, 
I average each legislator’s two single-year evaluations to create one score for the entire 
congressional term.
82
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 There are also a number of groups such as the AFL-CIO that periodically release “Life-time” 
ratings.  These are not included in our study.   
82
 If an organization only issued one card during the session, or a legislator only received one 
score by a group during the session, then his or her entire congressional term score is simply the 












13 A+  100-93 
12 A  92-85 
11 A-  84-77 
10 B+  76-69 
9 B  68-62 
8 B-  61-54 
7 C+  53-46 
6 C  45-38 
5 C-  37-31 
4 D+  30-23 
3 D  22-15 
2 D-  14-8 
1 F  7-0 
 
Since the individual evaluations represent a group’s level of satisfaction with a legislator 
for the congressional term, these evaluations, when aggregated, can be used to create a measure 
of the group’s overall satisfaction with the U.S. Senate in a given term.  A high mean score 
shows legislators consistently agreed with that group on the issues the group considered most 
important.  From this perspective, an interest group’s aggregated legislator evaluations can be 
viewed much like a teacher’s average grade for a classroom.  School districts and state 
administrators assess teacher effectiveness via aggregated test scores.  I evaluate interest group 
satisfaction with aggregated ratings.   
 The critiques of interest group ratings by authors such as Snyder (1992) and Groseclose 
and his associates (1999) address the problems associated with using scorecards as measures 
legislator preference or ideology.  Fortunately, I do not use scorecards to make inferences about 
legislators’ ideological positions.  Snyder (1992) could rightly contend that the 10 bills chosen 





senators A and B if both legislators vote “correctly” on all the bills. However, one can infer that 
the ADA was fairly equally satisfied with both legislators during the term because the groups 
choose the bills that are most important to them on which to evaluate legislators (Fowler 1982; 
Shipan and Lowry 2001). 
Likewise, Groseclose and his colleagues (1999) may rightly argue that a group’s 
aggregated scorecard rating is not an accurate representation of legislators’ overall preferences 
on an issue.  If the AFL-CIO chooses only nay votes on extreme anti-labor bills during a 
Republican majority term and only yea votes on equally extreme pro-labor bills during a 
Democratic majority (a highly unlikely scenario, but possible) the aggregated score for the 
Republican term could be higher than the Democratic score.  However, I am not measuring the 
preference or ideology of legislators.  In politics, just like in sports, sometimes you have to 
compete in a hostile environment; and your expected performance is naturally adjusted based on 
the conditions in which you compete.  The AFL-CIO will naturally be looking to advance its 
agenda under a large Democratic majority while intending not to lose ground with Republican 
majorities.  If the group defeats a barrage of anti-labor legislation under a Republican majority, 
we can safely assume that it was satisfied with the congressional term.  Likewise, if no pro-labor 
legislation is passed under Democratic control, we would expect the group to be disappointed.
83
   
Using scorecards as means of studying interest groups in the legislative process holds 
many advantages over previous methods.  For one, my method yields a large number of 
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 As a side note, while Groseclose and his colleagues do provide an example of the phenomena 
they discuss, it is unlikely that an organization will choose too many extremely liberal or 
conservative votes on which to base its ratings.  Krehbiel (1994, 68) notes that it seems safe to 
assume that groups chose their ratings criteria with the purpose of recording differences in 
legislators in order to target their lobbying efforts.  Furthermore, extreme bills, generally 
speaking, have little chance of passing.  For a bill to make it to the floor, for that matter, it has to 
achieve a certain level of support that means it most likely does not reflect the preferences of 





observations, without the time and resource-intensive work associated with using surveys or 
combing through hundreds, if not thousands, of legislative records for pertinent votes (e.g., 
Baumgartner et. al 2009).  Additionally, an interest group’s legislator satisfaction, derived from 
its scorecards, is an easily operationalizable concept that makes sense from a “face validity” 
stand point (Gaber and Gaber 2010).  The groups indicate what bills in the legislative term are 
important to them, similar to a survey respondent being asked what issues are important to him.  
I can say with confidence that the aggregated scores are derived from the most relevant policies 
at the adoption stage because groups invest considerable effort in choosing the bills they use for 
their scorecards (Fowler 1982; Shipan and Lowry 2001).  In addition to its easy of development, 
my measure also avoids the cumbersome process of operationalizing concepts such as influence 
that have hampered previous studies and, as some scholars have noted, have caused many 
researchers to avoid examining interest groups (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 15; Mahoney 
2007, 35).  
 I would also add that my measures are derived from the identifiable, specific events, 
which are policy positions taken by legislators – the overwhelming majority of which are 
recorded votes and bill sponsorships.  In other words, the aggregated scores are derived from 
evaluations of members of the Senate’s positions on relevant issues important to the groups.  
This stands in stark contrast to public evaluations of presidential and congressional performance 
and measures such as trust in government.  The more subjective nature of these measures have 
led some researchers to complain that they are largely impacted by outside conditions and 
events, e.g., heath of the economy or international crises, instead of policymakers actual 
positions (e.g., Mueller 1970; Stimson 1976; Weatherford 1984; Brody 1991, 91-103; Durr et al. 





 In the following chapter I discuss how I employ my transformed 13-point rating of 
members of the Senate to measure the legislative satisfaction of interest groups over time and 
changes in party control of the Senate.  I also provide my specific hypotheses and explain how I 
operationalize the other concepts in my study, including group type, lobbying, electioneering, 
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V. DATA, METHODS, AND FINDINGS 
Introduction  
 There are a large number of factors that could affect a group’s satisfaction with the 
Congress.  My primary variable of interest is the type of group issuing the legislator ratings.  Of 
course, the type of interests the organization represents is not the only possible explanation for its 
level of stratification.  Other possible explanations for variations in group satisfaction included in 
this study are the partisan makeup of the legislative body; the group’s political activities, such as 
electioneering and lobbying; and characteristics of the group, such as whether it represents a 
niche political interest.   
 This chapter covers my data, methodology, and the results of analysis for this 
dissertation.  I explain my methods for predicting variations in interest group satisfaction with 
the U.S. Senate.  Since I am attempting to test a variety of factors that may explain variations in 
group satisfaction, I use a mix of cross-sectional and time-series analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
and OLS regression procedures.  In order to utilize as many legislator ratings as possible, I 
aggregate my newly transformed scores (discussed in the last chapter) in two different ways.  
The first is by group type for each individual senate seat.  This method allows me to follow 
variations in group-type satisfaction from one term of the senate to the next.  I also aggregate the 
scores for each individual group, which allows me to test the relationship between satisfaction 
and group political activities and characteristics.  Additionally, I explain how I operationalize 
concepts such as what type of interest the group represents, its lobbying and electioneering, its 







Senate Partisanship and Group Type Satisfaction  
Scorecards can be used to track the legislative satisfaction of different types of groups 
over different terms of Congress and, consequently, variations in the partisan makeup of the 
legislative body examined.  To illustrate this, the legislator ratings in for this study were 
aggregated in two ways: by group type for individual senate seats and by individual groups.  
Both of these methods of aggregation allow me to answer different questions about interest 
group satisfaction with Congress.   
The first method of aggregation (group type for senate seats) answers questions regarding 
changes in interest group satisfaction over time.  To be included in any time-series analysis, an 
observation must be present at each data point within the studied period.  Most individual groups 
cannot be relied on to issue a scorecard for every term of Congress; therefore, aggregating the 
scores for individual groups leaves the majority of ratings unused, as the majority of groups will 
not issue a card for every legislative term.  Within my datasets, only 35 organizations issued 
cards during all six terms.  Still, each legislative term will have a large number of groups 
generate cards, even if most groups did not produce one in the preceding term or will not in the 
following.  While only 35 organizations in the datasets issued cards for all six terms, most terms 
had more than 100 groups issue cards.  The number of groups that participated in each term 
were: 83 in the 106
th
, 108 in the 107
th
, 137 in the 108
th
, 147 in the 109
th
, 145 in the 110
th
, and 99 
in the 111
th
.    
Because a mix of organizations from each group type issue cards during every term, the 
scores are aggregated according to group type for the linear portion of this study.  All of the 
organizations in my study are membership associations that represent one of four types of 





organizations, and (4) public interest nonprofits.  The first two groups are easily identified by 
their tax statuses.  Groups identified as business and professional trade associations file under 
subsection 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and will be noted in the data set under 
the variable “business.”  Examples of these groups include the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 
the National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors.   Labor unions, such as the AFL-
CIO, file under the 501(c)(5) subsection of the IRC and are identified as “labor.”   
Classifying public interest and charitable groups requires slightly more work because, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, large groups have begun developing multiple tax-exempt 
statuses to enhance their political activities.  The groups classified here as public interest are 
organizations with public, as opposed to private, policy goals – but are also non-charitable.  They 
perform the majority of their work under a 501(c)(4) status.  Such groups include the League of 
Conservation Voters (LCV), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Christian 
Coalition.  Many of the public interest groups in  this study are single-issue, ideological groups 
such Gun Owners of America, the National Right to Life Committee, and NARAL-Pro-choice 
America.   
Charitable groups fall under section 501(c)(3).  Some authors have defined all 
organizations in their studies with 501(c)(3) status as charitable (e.g., Child and Gronbjerg 2007; 
Leech 2006).  Defining charitable organizations in this manner, however, excludes a large 
number of groups with charitable missions that employ both 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) statuses in 
an effort to avoid IRS lobbying, and in some cases, electioneering restrictions. In this study, for 





“Americans for the Arts Action Fund.”
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 To further complicate matters, many ideological public 
interest organizations establish 501(c)(3) “educational” or foundation arms, which they primarily 
use for fundraising.
85
  Hence, the National Right to Life Committee can raise money via the 
National Right to Life Committee Educational Trust Fund.  In fact, even many unions and 
business associations form affiliated 501(c)(3)s: e.g., the AFL-CIO “Working for America 
Institute” and the U.S. Chamber’s “National Chamber Foundation.” 
Because both public interests and charitable groups often employ both 501(c)(3) and 
501(c)(4) statuses, distinctions based purely on tax status are not possible.  To get around this 
problem, I have classified these organizations based on the policy typology on which the group 
focuses (Lowi 1972; Tatalovich and Daynes 2005).  If a group’s focus is primarily educational or 
social service orientated, then its policy goals are redistributive in nature, as argued by Lowi 
(1972), and are thus classified as “charitable.”  Examples from this study are Americans for the 
Arts; the Children’s Defense Fund; and NETWORK, a National Catholic Social Justice Lobby.  
Groups with regulatory goals, e.g., mitigating pollution (see Lowi 1972), or social regulatory 
interests, e.g., abortion and gun control (see Tatalovich and Daynes 2005), are classified as 
“public interest.”  Such groups, in this study, include the LCV, NARAL, and Gun Owners of 
America. 
For the linear analysis, the ratings are aggregated by group type during a legislative term 
for each “senate seat.”  Because I want to track changes in legislative satisfaction, I have 
assigned a senate seat code to every single rating.  For example, the two seats for Alabama, the 
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 Some charitable organizations in this sample, (e.g., Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of 
Errants) only have a 501(c)(3) status. In rare cases when a group lobbies under both tax-exempt 
statuses, e.g., the Humane Society Legislative Fund and the Humane Society USA, I add the 
lobbying values together.  
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 Many 501(c)(5)s and 501(c)(6)s also create 501(c)(3) fundraising arms.  This is discussed in 





first state in alphabetical order, are coded as 1.1 for Jeff Sessions’s seat and 1.2 for Richard 
Shelby’s.  The seats for all of the following states are coded in the following manner, with 
Wyoming’s two seats (the last state in alphabetical order) receiving 50.1 and 50.2 values.  It is 
important to note inferences are not being made about individual legislators.  When the senate 
seat changes hands, the ratings used to produce the seat’s aggregated score come from a different 





 Congresses, is 4.1, the same as Mark Pryor’s (D-AR) during the 108
th





  Because the number and location of senate seats are static, this method creates a 
perfectly balanced study design, with exactly 100 observations for each level of each 
independent variable (i.e., the four group types).  Having a balanced design increases the power 
of the procedure (Shaw and Mitchell-Olds 1993). 
By following the changes in the senate seat’s scores, I am able to determine if certain 
groups are more vulnerable to changes in the partisan makeup of the senate.  To determine if the 
variations between terms for each group type are significantly different, a mixed-model repeated 
measure ANOVA was used.  This is similar to a normal repeated measures study, except it 
allows us to include our four-level nominal “group type” variable in the linear portion of the 
study.  Since this is a longitudinal analysis, each congressional term serves as an independent 
variable.   
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 Each senate seat receives an aggregated score for each group type during each legislative term.  
A total of 49 senate seats change hands at least once during the 12-year period we study.  There 
are a total of 65 times a seat changes hands, the vast majority of which are due to an election.  
Some seats change multiple times during the six terms, e.g., Jesse Helms old seat (coded as 
33.2), which passed from Helms to Elizabeth Dole at the beginning of the 108
th
 and then to Kay 
Hagan at the beginning of the 111
th
.  There are nine times a senate seat changes hands in the 
middle of the Congressional term: six times are due to death and three are due to resignations.  
On occasions when a seat changes hands in the middle of the term, the scores for each senator 





The repeated measures study design differs from a traditional experimental design.  
Instead of testing different subjects under different conditions, a repeated measures design allows 
for testing of the same subject under different conditions.  In this study, the subject tested under 
different conditions is the senate seat.  The aggregated scores will naturally fluctuate with 
partisan changes in the senate.  During the six terms for this study, the senate was controlled by 















  This design allows for the collection of 
data longitudinally, allowing for the assessment of changes over time.  Additionally, because I 
include the group type variable, I can compare groups within each term and between other 
groups and themselves over other terms.   This portion of the study is analogous to a pre- and 
post-test medical experiment.  Instead of evaluating the subjects’ performance before and after a 
medical treatment, however, the satisfaction of groups before and after elections is being 
evaluated.   
We know that groups representing private, for-profit industry and professions enjoy a 
mobilization advantage (e.g., Schattschneider 1960, 20- 46; Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 58-87; 
King and Walker 1991; Baumgartner and Leech 2001).  Prior scholars have produced compelling 
evidence that the business community can influence debates over various types of policies (e.g., 
Hunter 1955; Lindblom 1977; Gaventa 1980; Smith 2000; Kerwin 2003; Mahoney 2007). 
Furthermore, business and professional trade groups are more bipartisan than most interest 
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 For a little more than 19 weeks, the Senate was split evenly with 50 Democrats and 50 
Republicans during the 107
th
 Congress.  During this short period, Republicans were technically 
in control, with Vice President Dick Cheney serving as the tie-breaking vote, although all 
committees were evenly split between Democrat and Republican seats and overseen by co-chairs 
from each party.  Democrats took control in early June after Jim Jeffords decided to caucus with 
them.  This is defined this as a “Democrat control” session since they were in the majority for the 





groups when providing campaign support, although they tend to favor Republicans (Berry and 
Wilcox 2009, 28-32; McKay 2010).  Such being the case, one may presume that business groups 
should display fairly high levels of satisfaction regardless who controls the senate.  
Labor unions, on the other hand, overwhelmingly favor Democrats in their campaign 
activities (McKay 2010); so it seems reasonable to assume they will show higher levels of 
satisfaction with Democratic majorities. The consensus view is that Democrats are also more 
supportive of groups with charitable missions (Berry and Arons 2003, 66-92).  Therefore, they 
too should be more satisfied during Democratic majorities in the senate.   
For the stated reasons, I posit that business groups will be immune to the “medication” of 
congressional elections, while the scores of other groups will vary greatly based on the partisan 
makeup of the senate.  The aggregated mean values for labor and charitable groups should be 
higher under Democratic majorities – possibly as high, or even higher, than business groups – 
but their scores will drop significantly under Republican majorities, while business group scores 
will remain roughly the same, if not improve.  For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, 
the following hypotheses are made with respect to the partisan makeup of the Senate and the 
linear portion of this study:  
H1: Labor satisfaction scores for senate seats will be significantly higher under 
Democratic majorities than under Republican majorities. 
H2: Charitable satisfaction will be significantly higher under Democratic majorities than 
under Republican majorities. 
H3: Business and trade association satisfaction will be significantly higher than the 





H4: Business and trade association satisfaction will not be significantly different from 
labor and charitable scores under Democratic majorities.   
H5: Business and trade association satisfaction will be significantly higher than public 
interest satisfaction under both Republican and Democratic majorities.   
H6: Business and trade association satisfaction will not change significantly with the 
partisan makeup of the Senate.   
H7: Business scores should be consistently high (not significantly lower than scores for 
other groups) no matter who is in control of the Senate.  
Senate Partisanship and Group Type Satisfaction Results 
 After transforming all the individual ratings to the 13-point scale (discussed in the 
previous chapter), I was left with 67,020 senate ratings.  The decrease in number from the 
original 105,893 is due to averaging some groups’ two single-year ratings for legislators during 
one term of Congress.  Roughly half of groups prefer to issue cards yearly while the rest issue 
one rating for an entire term.  The exact numbers of transformed ratings for each group type are 
12,069 for business associations; 7,968 for labor; 13,522 for charitable groups; and 33,461 for 
public interest.   
To start the analysis, one large cross-sectional ANOVA was run on all the newly-adjusted 
individual legislator ratings before they are aggregated.  The results suggest the hypothesis that 
business associations will produce high levels of satisfaction, regardless of who is in control of 
the senate, may be correct (H7).  The omnibus F-statistic does show statistically significant 
differences between the groups.  Although the Levene test for homogeneity indicates the groups 
have unequal variances, which was to be expected, the Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests with 





Howell post hoc comparisons, both of which are robust with unequal variances (Kirk 1995, 147), 
show business group scores to be significantly higher than those for the three other group types.  
In fact, the differences between all four group types are significantly different, with charitable 
and labor scores (which are second and third highest, respectively) showing the most similarity.  
The results for this analysis of the 67,020 individual ratings can be seen in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Individual Legislator Ratings for Four Group Types 
 Business Labor Charitable 
Public  
Interest Total 
Mean 8.04(a) 7.47(c) 7.65(b) 6.65(d) 7.2 
Std. Deviation 4.54 4.92 4.72 4.7 6.74 
N 12,069 7,968 13,522 33,461 67,020 
F-statistic     333.76** 
Note: Cell entries are means from a one-way analysis of variance using GLM.  Within 
 each column, means with different letters are significantly different from each other  
(alpha <.05) according to a post hoc Bonferroni and Game-Howell test. 
Levene statistic =137.21** 
Welch statistic=342.2** 
Brown-Forsythe =329.87** 
*p <.05; **p <.01 
 
The primary focus, of course, for this part of the study is the repeated measures analysis 
that can track changes in satisfaction over each term of the Senate.  For the repeated measures 
portion of the study, mean business, labor, charitable, and public interest scores for all 100 senate 
seats during each term were created.  I have started this larger analysis by running one large 
mixed factor, repeated measures model for all six terms and four group types.  The mixed factor, 
repeated measures model’s omnibus F-statistics for both the repeating senate term variable and 
the interaction term are significant.
88
  The omnibus F-statistic for the group type main effect is 
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 The Mauchly’s test for sphericity was significant.  I used the Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted 
degrees of freedom, ε <.75.  Greenhouse-Geisser F(3.197, 1266.07) = 10.163, p <.01 for 





also significant.  This means that the group type aggregated ratings did change significantly with 
the changing makeup of the Senate.   
The plot of the estimated marginal means in Figure 5.1 reveals an interesting trend.  
Business group scores remain relatively high and mostly unaffected by the changes over senate 
terms until the 111
th





 Senate followed the 2008 elections, during which Democrats picked up the White 
House and made huge gains in both houses of Congress following the 2008 financial meltdown.  
Democrats briefly held a 60-seat majority during the term.
90
  The lower overall evaluation by 
business groups could be their reaction to Democrats’ aggressive pushes for financial reform (the 
Dodd-Frank Act) and health care reform (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).  More 
investigation is needed to know the exact cause.   
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 Curiously, charitable group scores also dip down during the 111
th
 Senate.  I have no 
explanation for this.  
90
 This 60 seat majority included two independents, Joe Lieberman and Bernie Sanders, who 
both caucused with the Democrats.  Democrats started with the term holding 58 seats. Their 
majority increased to 59 with the party change of Arlen Spector on April 30, 2009 and to 60 after 
Minnesota’s contested election was decided for Al Franken, who was sworn in on July 7.  Ted 
Kennedy’s death on Aug. 25 dropped it again, until Paul Kirk was appointed the following 
month.  Their majority dropped below 60 for good after February 4, 2010, when Scott Brown 
was sworn in after winning a special election for Kennedy’s seat.  The aggregated scores for 
senate seat 21.1 (Kennedy’s old seat) in our dataset consists of ratings issued for Kennedy, Kirk, 
and Brown during the 111
th






Figure 5.1: Plot of Group Type Means per Senate Term 
 
  
Post hoc analyses for mixed factor, repeated measures models use pooled estimated 
marginal mean values, which make it difficult to detect differences between different levels of 
different variables.  In other words, the post hoc test for such a model can only reveal if there are 
differences between the senate terms while taking into account the scores for all group types.  
Additionally, it can only determine if business group scores are significantly higher than other 
groups when taking into account all terms, including the 111
th
.  From visual inspection of the 
estimated marginal means plot, it is reasonable to deduce that business association scores would 
be significantly higher than those of other groups under Republican control, when labor and 
charitable ratings usually drop (H3).
91
   
I have run additional tests to search for statistically significant differences between levels 
of factor A (senate term) while isolating across levels of factor B (group type), and vice versa.  
The first question I seek to answer is: Do partisan changes in the senate lead to different levels of 
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 Public interest group ratings are typically low no matter who controls the Senate.  This is 
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group type satisfaction?  I hypothesize that there will be few statistically significant changes in 
the ratings for business associations.  Labor and charitable ratings will fluctuate with party 
changes of control of the Senate (H1 and H2).  Business satisfaction should remain relatively high 
and not fluctuate significantly with changes in partisan control of the senate (H3, through H7).  I 
have run one-way repeated measures ANOVAs for each group type to determine if the 
aggregated group type ratings significantly change with partisan changes in the senate.  As 
expected, the four group-type repeated measures one-way ANOVAs reported in Table 5.2 bear 
out these predictions almost precisely.  Business group scores show no significant changes from 
the 106
th
 to the 110
th
 (H6).  In fact, the post hoc comparisons for those five terms produce p-
values of 1.0.  The business group ratings for the111
th
, however, are significantly lower (below 
the 0.01 level) than the other five sessions.  Labor scores significantly increase every time 
Democrats take over control from Republicans (H1).  Charitable scores improve with every 
increase in Democratic control, excluding the inexplicable drop during the 111
th
 (H2).  Public 
interest group scores remain low, although there are some significant changes.
92
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 The changes in public interest scores across terms are small, but “significant” due to the small 
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51 % Rep 
Majority 
55 % Rep 
Majority 
51 % Dem 
Majority 
58 % Dem 
Majority Group Types 
Business Means 8.16(a) 7.80(a) 8.44(a) 8.46(a) 8.18(a) 6.89(b) 7.99 
Std. Deviation 1.52 1.46 2.86 1.45 1.16 1.16  
a
N of Groups 8 20 23 31 32 15  
b
Previous Term - 40% 52% 55% 59% 87%  
Labor Means 6.55(a) 7.71(b, c) 7.22(a, b) 6.98(a) 8.24(c) 8.09(b, c) 7.46 
Std. Deviation 4.14 4.23 4.53 4.12 4.23 4.74  
N of Groups 15 16 16 14 12 12  
Previous Term - 75% 88% 93% 67% 50%  
Charitable Means 7.42(a, c, d) 8.47(b) 7.74(c, d) 6.89(a) 8.22(b, d) 6.97(a, c) 7.26 
Std. Deviation 3.67 3.18 2.96 3.70 2.64 3.84  
N of Groups 16 22 29 24 27 22  
Previous Term - 50% 59% 63% 59% 77%  
Pub Interest Means 6.88(a) 6.62(b, d) 6.37(c) 6.62(d) 6.68(a, b, d) 6.80(a, b, d) 6.66 
Std. Deviation 0.70 0.76 0.54 0.70 0.36 0.38  
N of Groups 44 50 69 77 74 50  
Previous Term - 64% 57% 68% 77% 82%  
Notes: Each congressional term is based on exactly 100 Senate seat scores.  Means that share a common letter are not significantly different according to Bonferroni post hoc test 
(alpha = 0.05).  Letters are based on post hoc tests for separate one-way repeated measures analysis than the mixed-model analysis use to produce the omnibus F-statistics.  While 
mean values remain the same for the one-way and mixed-model analysis, the letters cannot be compared across group type.   
Mauchly's W for Congressional Term=525.8**     
cCongressional Term F-statistic=10.16**     
cInteraction F-statistic=12.16**     
Group Type=5.1**     
**p <.01        
aNotes the number of groups to issue ratings during the congressional term.   
bPercent of groups from current term to have issued card in previous term.   









To what extent do differences exist in mean score values between group types within 
each congress?  To answer this question, traditional one-way ANOVAs were run for all six 
senate term, which are presented in Table 5.3.  Doing this reveals that business scores are 
generally higher than those for other groups.  Business scores are significantly higher (at least 
below the 0.05 level) than public interest in all but the 111
th
 Congress.  They are significantly 
higher than labor scores (below 0.05) in all three Republican controlled terms, and are higher 
than charitable scores in the 109
th
 (below 0.01) (H3).  In none of the 18 pairswise comparisons 
for business means over the six terms were business scores significantly lower than of the other 
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 Business scores were lower than labor’s during the 111
th
 (p =.041) according to the Bonferroni 
post hoc.  We limited “significant” findings to only differences (alpha = .05) detected by both the 
Bonferroni and Game-Howell, both of which were used for the cross-sectional analyses.  The 









Table 5.3: Post Hoc Comparisons of Group Means within Senate Terms 
Congressional Term 
Group Type Congressional  
Term  
Means Business Labor Charitable Public Interest 
106th 54% Rep Majority 8.16(a) 6.55(b) 7.42(a, b) 6.88(b) 7.25 
Std. Deviation 1.52 4.14 3.67 0.70  
N 100 100 100 100  
107th 51% Dem Majority 7.8(a) 7.71(a, b) 8.47(a) 6.62(b) 7.65 
Std. Deviation 1.46 4.23 3.18 0.76  
N 100 100 100 100  
108th 51 % Rep Majority 8.44(a) 7.22(a, b) 7.74(a) 6.37(b) 7.44 
Std. Deviation 2.86 4.53 2.96 0.54  
N 100 100 100 100  
109th 55 % Rep Majority 8.46(a) 6.98(b) 6.89(b) 6.62(b) 7.24 
Std. Deviation 1.45 4.12 3.70 0.70  
N 100 100 100 100  
110th 51 % Dem Majority 8.18(a) 8.24(a) 8.22(a) 6.68(b) 7.83 
Std. Deviation 1.16 4.23 2.64 0.36  
N 100 100 100 100  
111th 58 % Dem Majority 6.89(a, b) 8.09(a) 6.97(a, b) 6.80(b) 7.19 
Std. Deviation 1.16 4.74 3.84 0.38  
N 100 100 100 100   
Notes: Group type means with different letters are significantly different from each other (alpha = .05) 
according to both Bonferroni and Games-Howell post hoc tests.  The letters cannot be compared across 
congressional terms. Post hoc comparisons are based off one-way analysis of variance for the six 
congressional terms.  The Brown-Forsythe omnibus statistics were significant (alpha = .05) for all six 
models.  The Welch was significant for all models except the 111th, where p = .053. 
 
The findings of the ANOVA portion of this study mostly support H1 through H7, 
although a few caveats should be stated.  With respect to H2, charitable scores do generally 
increase with increases in Democrats in the senate, except during the 111
th
.  While I lack a 
researched explanation for this decrease during the time of a large Democratic majority, it is 
possible these lower scores reflect the disappointment of charitable groups who had higher 
expectations for this term.  With H3, business scores were consistently higher than labor and 









business scores were not significantly higher than charitable scores.  Lastly, with respect to H6, 
business scores do not fluctuate, except during the 111
th
 senate.  As mentioned earlier, the large 
Democratic majority of the 111
th
 produces the only business score that is significantly different 
from those in the other terms. 
Analysis of Group Activities and Characteristics  
The analysis in the previous section reveals what types of groups are satisfied with 
Congress and tracks variations in satisfaction over different partisan majorities.  Such analysis, 
however, provides no clue as to whether an organization’s political activities, such as lobbying 
and electioneering, can lead to higher levels of satisfaction with congressional policy.  To answer 
questions regarding whether a group’s political activities and group characteristics (e.g., 
membership and wealth) can impact the organization’s level of legislative satisfaction, the 
ratings were also aggregated by individual group.  For this method of aggregation, the unit of 
analysis is the individual group.   
A group’s aggregated score for the entire congressional term (whether based on two cards 
or one) is an excellent indicator of how overall satisfied the organization was with the term.  I 
test the groups’ overall satisfaction with the senate during each term against five independent 
variables related to group political activities and characteristics.  The first is the organization’s 
wealth.  While “it is obvious that the wealthier the group, the more advantages” it has 
(Baumgartner et. al. 2009, 193), a group’s financial wealth has not traditionally been a subject of 
study in examinations of interest groups and public policy.  Recent examinations have found that 
a group’s overall wealth is not an indication of whether the organization is more likely to get 
what it wants (Berry and Arons 2003, 134; Baumgartner et. al. 2009, 198-204).  As a measure of 





from the revenue values reported on the group’s Form 990s during the two years of the senate 
term.
94
  If the group holds multiple tax-exempt statuses, e.g., a 501(c)(6) and a 501(c)(3), the 
revenue amounts from the different tax statuses were added together before averaging the one-
year value with the value of the other year in the term.  The revenue information was collected 
from Guide Star and the National Center for Charitable Statistics.
95
   
Since organizations can seek to influence legislators directly through lobbying and 
indirectly through electioneering, I have also collected data on how much the groups engage in 
each of these activities.  While studies on the effectiveness of lobbying have been somewhat 
contradictory, scholars have found it to be successful under specific and narrow conditions 
(Smith 1995).  Still, the majority of lobbying campaigns, even large ones, are not successful 
(Baumgartner et. al. 2009).   Data on the amount organizations spent on registered lobbyists 
during this study’s period is collected from the Center for Responsive Politics to create a 
lobbying variable, which is the average of the amount the group spent on lobbying during the 
two years of the senate term.
96
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 A nonprofit’s “revenue” accounts for moneys it generated under its tax-exempt status.  The 
vast majority of revenue for groups in my study is generated from donations from the group’s 
individual members.  However, nonprofits can generate revenue from services for which they 
charge if the proceeds are applied to the organizations mission, e.g., tuition received by a 
university.  See “Understanding the IRS Form 990,” 
http://www.guidestar.org/rxa/news/articles/2001-older/understanding-the-irs-form-
990.aspx#part1 (accessed June 7, 2012).   
95
 Guide Star is a nonprofit information service organization that specializes in reporting on 
nonprofit groups.  Data collected by the group is intend to help donors with decisions on giving 
and researchers interested in nonprofit management issues.  For more information, see: 
http://www.guidestar.org/rxg/about-us/index.aspx.  
96
 Organizations report their lobbying expenses to comply with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 
1995 (LDA), which does not require groups to specify the exact amount spent if it is under 
$20,000 for the one-year reporting period.  While some groups do report exact amounts that fall 
below the $20,000 threshold, the majority do not.  Those that do not are assigned a $9,997.10 
lobby value. This near-median value allows me to distinguish within the dataset between groups 





Scholars have enthusiastically attempted to study if PAC contributions influence 
legislative decisions (Cigler 1994, 29-30); yet, there is little evidence of contributions leading to 
legislative success (Baumgartner et. al. 2009, 194; Smith 1995).  Of course, a group could spend 
on campaign activities and elect a new slate of legislators who agree with the group in the first 
place (i.e., the indirect route to policy success).  However, the cost of achieving electoral success 
is so high – and getting higher with each election cycle – that electing a large slate of new 
legislators would be difficult for any one group (Ainsworth 2002, 196; Wright 1996, 135).  Any 
money spent by an organization’s connected PAC to influence Senate races, either through direct 
contributions to candidates or through PAC-purchased independent expenditures, is also 
included in my study.  However, since BCRA went into effect in 2004, political nonprofits have 
also sought to influence elections through the use of so-called 527 organizations (Malbin 2006).  
These electioneering tools have been particularly popular with unions (Weissman and Hassan 
2006, 90).  While there have not been any studies of legislative influence exerted by 527s, it 
would make sense to include all electioneering expenses of a group.  Therefore, I have created a 
campaigning independent variable which is produced by adding all of a group’s senate PAC 
contributions and PAC independent expenditures to any money spent by an affiliated 527 
organization(s) in the election cycle immediately prior to the creation of the scorecard.
97
   
In the past it has been assumed that large groups (which presumably advocate for more 
popular causes) should hold more influence with Congress (e.g., Key 1961, 503; Berry 1997, 
234).  Such an assumption, however, has only recently been examined, with scholars finding that 
a large organizational membership is not a predictor of legislative success (Berry and Arons 
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 In other words, money spent in the 2004 election is tested for scorecards created over the 2005 
and 2006 congressional session.  Electioneering data was collected from the Center for 





2003, 122-136; Baumgartner et. al. 2009, 202-204).  To account for the popularity of the 
organization’s cause, data were collected on each group’s membership and the circulation of its 
major publication, which is usually its member newsletter.  I have averaged the membership and 
circulation numbers for each year of the term and then averaged the values for the two years 
together to create “membership” variable.
98
  The membership and circulation numbers were 
collected from (Encyclopedia of Associations, annual).
99  
 
Finally, some scholars have argued that business groups are sometimes successful 
because they represent well-funded “niche” populations (Browne 1990; Baumgartner and Leech 
2001).  The niche representation by some business associations has long been recognized. As 
Schattschneider (1960, 23-25 and 32) noted that most business associations represent issues of 
interest to small sectors of society compared to issues for public interest and charitable groups. 
Such niche organizations tend to be well-financed groups with small memberships, e.g., the 
Information Technology Industry and the American Forest and Paper Association. To account 
for the presence of well-funded niche groups, a proxy measure was developed for determining 
whether the group represents a wealthy niche interest, which I call the “revenue per member.”  
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 I create an average between the membership and circulation values because some 
organizations will only report one or the other, although most will report both.  For organizations 
that only report one, the value of the membership variable is equal to the one reported value.  




 senates, I ran a correlation 
between the membership and circulation values to confirm that the variables were appropriate 
substitutes for each other.  The Pearson product moment was .966 (p<,001).   
99
 The membership and circulation numbers reported in the Encyclopedia of Associations are 
always one year behind the date of publication.  In other words, edition 45, which was published 
in 2006, has membership numbers for groups in 2005.  This is due to the way the publication 





This variable is an interactive term created by dividing the revenue variable (after averaging the 
two years) by the membership value (also after averaging the two years).
100
   
 For this portion of the study, the impact of multiple independent variables on a 
continuous dependent variable (the mean scorecard value of each group by year) are being 
examined.  Thus, OLS regression is used for this portion of the study.  Based off the literature 
mentioned here and more thoroughly discussed in the previous chapters, I offer the following 
hypotheses for this portion of the study:  
 H8: Wealth will not be significantly related to mean scores.   
H9: A group’s membership size will not be significantly related to mean scores.   
 H10: Electioneering activities will not be significantly related to mean scores.   
 H11: Lobbying will not be significantly related to mean scores.   
 H12: The revenue per member values will be significant predictors of higher aggregated 
means. 
Results of Group Activities and Characteristics Analysis  
 For this portion of the analysis I have run two models during each term of the senate: one 
with the revenue per member interaction term and one with only the main effects.  Because the 
distribution of each of the interval-level variables was highly skewed, the natural logs of the 
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 One might question whether an organization can raise a large of amount of money (e.g., with 
grants or large corporate donations) and still have a small number of members. This is highly 
unlike with the groups in this study. The vast majority of organizations we examine issue cards 
from non-501(c)(3) tax statuses. Most foundations do not give contributions to non-501(c)(3) 
groups because donations are not tax deductible and large contributions (those over $13,000 as 
of 2011) are subject to a hefty gift tax (see Briffault 2005, 956; Berry 2006, 239; Alliance for 





values were used for the models.  I have also included dummy variables to indicate what type of 
group the organization is, using public interest organizations as the omitted group.
 101
  
The sample sizes for the models in this portion of the analysis are considerably smaller 
than what existed in the ANOVA analysis.  This is due to two factors.  First, not all of the 249 
groups in this study issued a scorecard during each term of the senate.  Second, revenue values 
could not be obtained for all groups that issued cards during the terms.
102
  As a result, the number 
of observations for several of the senate terms is smaller.  The largest number of observations is 
during the 109
th
, is 82 groups, and the smallest is during the 111
th
, with only 49.  Because I am 
dealing with such small sample sizes, the standard for significance for this portion of the study 
have been relaxed by using an alpha of 0.1. The findings for the regression analyses are 
reported in tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6.  
 






























LN_Campaign -0.064 -0.070* 0.062 0.066 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.046) 
LN_Lobbying 0.018 0.007 -0.027 -0.021 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.046) (0.043) 
LN_Member-Circ -0.048  0.102  
 (0.090)  0.113  
LN_Revenue -0.090  -0.042  
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 I ran different iterations of these models including public interest groups and excluding labor 
and charitable groups.  The results for these models were largely the same as those presented in 
this chapter.  
102
 Missing observations for the groups’ revenue were imputed using the Amelia program made 





 (0.102)  (0.123)  
LN_Revenue   -0.008  -0.071 
   per Member  (0.078)  (0.098) 
Business 1.559** 1.643** 1.707** 1.628** 
 (0.697) (0.696) (0.669) (0.647) 
Charitable 0.613 0.571 -1.786** -1.770** 
 (0.474) (0.473) (0.682) (0.675) 
Labor 0.083 0.095 -0.070 -0.047 
 (0.566) (0.562) (0.669) (0.662) 
Constant 8.953*** 7.7178*** 5.639** 6.371*** 
 (1.643) (0.486) (1.912) (0.655) 
N 60 60 65 65 
Adjusted R Square .115 .110 .261 .269 
Note: The dependent variable is the mean legislator rating value for each interest 
group. Continuous variables are in natural log values. Cells report parameter 
estimates from OLS Regression with standard errors in parentheses.  





































LN_Campaign -0.002 0.001 -0.053 -0.043 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) 
LN_Lobbying -0.067* -0.064** -0.022 -0.012 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) 
LN_Member-Circ 0.038  -0.080  
 (0.081)  (0.081)  
LN_Revenue -0.017  0.153  
 (0.093)  (0.104)  
LN_Revenue   -0.020  0.111 
   per Member  (0.070)  (0.073) 
Business 2.561*** 2.530*** 2.068*** 2.003*** 
 (0.473) (0.463) (0.412) (0.401) 
Charitable 1.626** 1.640*** 0.502 0.535 
 (0.451) (0.446) (0.421) (0.416) 
Labor 0.979* 0.998* 0.874* 0.917* 
 (0.531) (0.523) (0.523) (0.514) 
Constant 6.878*** 7.082*** 5.467*** 6.306*** 
 (1.456) (0.503) (1.459) (0.514) 
N 73 73 82 82 
Adjusted R Square .273 .283 .296 .303 
Note: The dependent variable is the mean legislator rating value for each interest 
group. Continuous variables are in natural log values. Cells report parameter 
estimates from OLS Regression with standard errors in parentheses.  





































LN_Campaign -0.027 -0.036 -0.042 -0.040 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.048) (0.046) 
LN_Lobbying 0.052 0.041 0.034 0.036 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.053) (0.049) 
LN_Member-Circ -0.130  0.005  
 (0.118)  (0.107)  
LN_Revenue 0.031  0.015  
 (0.166)  (0.131)  
LN_Revenue   0.108  0.000 
   per Member  (0.109)  (0.089) 
Business 0.521 0.618 0.085 0.076 
 (0.698) (0.669) (0.664) (0.646) 
Charitable 0.693 0.644 0.099 0.086 
 (0.671) (0.661) (0.608) (0.591) 
Labor 1.316 1.230 1.927** 1.947** 
 (0.859) (0.843) (0.608) (0.747) 
Constant 7.528*** 6.188*** 6.047*** 6.315*** 
 (2.445) (0.872) (2.211) (0.722) 
N 67 67 49 49 
Adjusted R Square -.002a .010 .065 .087 
Note: The dependent variable is the mean legislator rating value for each interest 
group. Continuous variables are in natural log values. Cells report parameter 
estimates from OLS Regression with standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. 
a The R2 in this model was .104. The formula for Adjusted R2 does allow for negative 









Largely as predicted, the models suggest that political activities and a group’s overall 
revenue and membership size seem to be unrelated to the organization’s overall satisfaction with 
the senate.  The revenue and membership main effects are not significant for any of the 12 
models (H8 and H9).  On only three occasions are any of the political activity variables 
statistically significant.  Campaigning shows a significant negative relationship (below the 0.1 
level) with mean scorecard ratings in Model 2, which is the 106
th
 Senate model to include the 
interaction term.  Lobbying produces significant negative relationships for both models in the 
108
th
 Senate (below the 0.05 level with the interaction term and below the 0.1 level without).  
Because lobbying and campaigning are only significant for three of the 12 models (and only 
during two senate terms), I am inclined to interpret the three significant outputs as anomalies and 
conclude that political activities have little relationship to groups’ mean scorecard ratings (H10 
and H11).  Based on these findings, I feel it is safe to accepted H8 and H11.   
I am surprised, and rather disappointed, to find that the revenue per member variable, my 
proxy measure for determining whether the organization is a niche interest, is not significant for 
any of the six models in which it was included (H12).  In fact, it is only close to significant for 
Model 8 from the 109
th
 Senate (where p = 0.131).  Still, the inclusion of the revenue per member 
interaction term may be an improvement over the main-effects models.  For five of the six senate 
terms, models with the interaction term have produced higher adjusted R
2 
values.  In fact, for the 
main effects models, the gap between the R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 tends to be rather large, indicating 
that there may be unnecessary independent variables in the models.  
There are several possible explanations for the findings regarding the revenue per 
member interaction term.  For one, it is plausible that my measure is not an accurate indication of 





my number of observations required imputation to fill missing revenue values and interpolating 
some of the membership values.  Such procedures always run the risk of lowering the validity of 
measures.  Of course, even without using any estimation methods to replace missing values of 
the main effects, my interaction term may simply have been too imprecise of a measure for 
determining whether the group represents a wealthy niche population.  Finally, it is also quite 
possible that groups representing wealthy niche interests are not any more satisfied with 
legislators.  No matter what the explanation is, these findings leave me little choice but to reject 
H12.  
The findings with respect to the group type dummy variables are interesting and more 
encouraging.  Business and professional trade associations produce significantly higher scores in 
all but the last two senate terms, which largely supports the findings of the ANOVA models.  
Labor unions produce significantly higher scores (below the 0.01 level) during the large 
Democratic majority of the 111
th
, which is not surprising.  What is somewhat surprising is that 





when Republicans controlled the Senate.  Charitable groups also produce significantly larger 
mean scores in the 108
th
 (below 0.05 with the main effects and below 0.01 with interaction).  The 
fact that business, labor, and charitable groups all produce significantly higher scores in the 108
th
 
could be explained by the extremely low public interest (the omitted group) scores during that 
term.  Finally, charitable scores are significantly lower for both models during the 107
th
, when 
Democrats were in control of the Senate. This may simply be due to the small number of 
charitable observations in this term (only 10 groups).  Note that in the repeated measures 
ANOVA analysis – which was based on a larger number of groups – charitable scores were 





Testing Scorecard Standard Deviations  
 Of course, there is only so much that can be deduced from a mean.  A group that 
produces all 50 or C+ evaluations (both of which equal a 7 on my transformed variable scale) 
would yield the same mean as a group with half perfect evaluations (100 and A+) and half lowest 
possible evaluations (0 or F).  Snyder (1992, 319) claims that most scorecards have bi-modal 
distributions of evaluations.  This would have certainly been the case for highly partisan groups 
such as Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the American Conservative Union (ACU), 
which most scorecard studies used in 1980s and 1990s.  Indubitably, an overtly liberal or 
conservative group will produce a bi-modal distribution, with Democrats consistently siding with 
the former and Republicans with the latter.  However, the assertion that interest group ratings 
depict “artificial extremism” in legislator preferences (Snyder 1992) may be overstated, due to 
prior researchers’ tendencies to study highly ideological groups such as the ADA and ACU.  In 




 Senate, has shown 
that most business cards produce unimodal distributions, with the modal score higher than the 
mean and median (Chand and Schreckhise 2011).   Figure 5.2 illustrates evaluations from the 
108
th
 Congress, placed on my 13-point scale.  Notice the extreme spread of ratings for the 
National Right to Life Committee (a public interest group), with the majority of legislators 
receiving either the highest or lowest scores.  Scores for American Forest and Paper are clustered 
toward the higher end of the distribution, with a solid plurality receiving the highest possible 
score.  Indeed, if business groups are more satisfied with legislators, then one would expect 
legislators to vote in more cohesive blocs on issues important to them.  Consequently, a 
scorecard for a business group, or any group dealing with less divisive issues, should produce a 





groups are producing the largest and smallest distributions of evaluations, the standard deviation 
between individual legislator ratings as a dependent variable is used.  
 





 Based on my previous work with business association scorecards, I make the following 
hypothesis:  
H13: Business and trade association scorecards will produce significantly lower standard 





Standard Deviation Results  
 Reported below in tables 5.7 and 5.8 are the results of six cross-sectional OLS regression 
models, one for each senate term.  In the models presented, the groups’ standard deviation scores 
are analyzed against campaign activities, lobbying, and revenue per member values.  Dummy 
variables representing business, charitable, and labor groups are included, with public interest 
groups once again serving as the omitted group.
103
  The only instances where political activities 




 senates.  
Campaigning is positively related to standard deviations in the 106
th
 (below the 0.01 level), 
meaning the more groups spent on campaigns in the previous election cycle, the larger the 
deviations between ratings in the following term.  Lobbying is positively related to standard 
deviations in the 109
th
 (below the 0.1 level).  Because these are the only instances where political 
activities show any significant relationship to deviation scores, I am inclined to interpret these 
two cases of statistical significances as flukes, and reject any assumption that groups who spend 
more on political activities produce larger deviations in their legislator ratings.   
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 As with the OLS models examining scorecard means, I also ran different iterations of the 
standard deviation models including public interest groups and excluding labor and charitable 












Note: The dependent variable is the standard deviation value for each 
interest group’s ratings during the senate term. Continuous variables are in 
natural log values. Cells report parameter estimates from OLS Regression 
with standard errors in parentheses.  
















LN_Campaign 0.078*** 0.003 -0.010 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.027) 
LN_Lobbying -0.004 0.031 -0.004 
 (0.023) (0.032) (0.023) 
LN_Revenue  -0.036 -0.025 -0.030 
   per Member (0.058) (0.073) (0.052) 
Business -0.106 0.153 -0.472 
 (0.522) (0.473) (0.343) 
Charitable 0.461 -0.628 -0.638 
 (0.356) (0.502) (0.330) 
Labor 0.263 -0.005 0.105 
 (0.420) (0.496) (0.388) 
Constant 4.019*** 3.577*** 4.892*** 
 (0.363) (0.499) (0.372) 
N 60 65 73 
Adjusted R 
Square 
















Model 5  
110th  






LN_Campaign 0.002 0.028 0.018 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.035) 
LN_Lobbying 0.037* 0.024 -0.012 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.037) 
LN_Revenue  0.020 -0.016 0.041 
   per Member (0.055) (0.065) (0.068) 
Business -0.781** -0.986** -0.816
a 
 (0.308) (0.398) (0.490) 
Charitable 0.313 -0.548 -0.121 
 (0.317) (0.393) (0.448) 
Labor 0.414 0.174 0.499 
 (0.383) (0.502) (0.566) 
Constant 3.735*** 3.826*** 4.638*** 
 (0.391) (0.519) (0.547) 
N 82 67 49 
Adjusted R Square .118 .114 .040 
Note: The dependent variable is the standard deviation value for each 
interest group’s ratings during the senate term. Continuous variables are in 
natural log values. Cells report parameter estimates from OLS Regression 
with standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. 
a p = .104 
 
My primary interest with standard deviation tests is the business dummy variable.  If H13 
is correct, then the business dummy variable should be significant, with the unstandardized 
coefficients being negative.  The business dummy variable is the only variable to be statistically 
significant for multiple terms and for five out of the six models (Model 2 for the 107
th
 Senate 
being the one exception) business groups are negatively related to standard deviation scores.  









0.05 level).  It is close to significant for the 111
th
 (p = 0.104).
104
  Taken as a whole, these 
findings are not strong enough for me to accept H13.  Indeed, Snyder (1992) may have been 
correct in his assumption that most organizations, even business groups, produce bi-model 
scorecards.   
Discussion 
 The findings of the analyses presented in this chapter provide mixed support for my 
hypotheses on interest group satisfaction with legislators.  Assuming my measures of legislative 
satisfaction based on interest group scorecards are valid, there are several inferences one can 
make from the analyses presented here.  The assertion that business associations are, generally 
speaking, more satisfied with legislators and legislative policy (Baumgartner et. al. 2009; 
Mahoney 2007; Smith 2000) is largely support by both the ANOVA and regression analyses.  
Also supported by the findings here are the hypotheses regarding labor and charitable 
satisfaction, both of which fluctuate with partisan changes in the Senate.  My hypotheses on 
political activities not being related to group satisfaction also appear to be correct.  Engaging in 
lobbying and electioneering, even in large amounts, does not necessarily increase groups’ overall 
satisfaction with legislators.  This, of course, is not to say these activities have no effect on 
legislators or policy decisions.  As discussed in chapter 2, many scholars have found these 
activities to be influential under narrow conditions that my study is unable to replicate.  It is quite 
conceivable that a group could spend significantly in opposition of a single bill (which is 
included on the group’s scorecard) that ultimately passes the Senate, resulting in a low average 
rating for the group.  Still, the group’s lobbying activities may very well have led to a less 
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objectionable version of said bill passing the senate than would have passed had the group not 
lobbied at all.   
 This study adds to the limited research conducted on interest groups overall wealth and 
popularity.  Similar to the other studies to examine these variables (Berry and Arons 2003; 
Baumgartner et al. 2009), this study finds that neither is related to a group’s overall satisfaction 
with legislators.  I am disappointed to find that my proxy measure for niche interests is not 
related to overall satisfaction of legislators.  Despite this finding, there is prior evidence 
indicating that such interest groups are successful at influencing policy (Browne 1990; 
Baumgartner and Leech 2001).  It is quite possible that my revenue per member variable 
inadequately serves as a measure of wealthy niche interests.  The study of interest groups would 
greatly benefit from future examinations of this issue.  Finally, I am unable to dispute Snyder’s 
(1992) claim of scorecards depicting artificial extremism, at least based on my standard 
deviations analysis.  I postulated that business association scorecards would show smaller 
deviations between ratings than scorecards for other groups.  For most of the terms of the senate 
studied here, however, the standard deviations for business cards were not significantly lower 
than those for other groups.   
  In the following concluding chapter, I place my findings in the context of the prior 
literature on interest groups.  I also discuss the implications of my use of scorecards and 
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Introduction  
 More than 200 years after Madison published the Federalist #10 we still confront the 
same problems he addressed: 1) that “factions” exist in free societies; and 2) factions can often 
lay clams to government that run contrary to the best interest of the majority (Madison 1787).  At 
the heart of Madison’s dilemma is a question of fairness.  Is it fair that a powerful group (or 
groups) of interests can use the institutions of government to best serve the needs of its members 
as opposed to the needs of society at large?  Madison answers “no” to this question, and most 
people today would agree.  Madison’s solution of creating a large arena of debate in which 
competing interests will serve as a check on each other was widely accepted among early 
pluralist scholars (e.g., Dahl 1961; Merelman 1968; Sayre and Kaufman 1960; Wolfinger 1971).  
And some scholars have supported Madison’s claims by noting that the size and diversity of our 
country’s interest group society has at least made it more difficult for a small set of interests to 
consistently dominate the American political system (Berry and Wilcox 2009, 188).  Yet, despite 
having a more diverse interest group system now than has ever existed in our country’s history 
(Berry and Wilcox 2009), the ability of relatively small sectors of society to exercise 
disproportionate influence in the policymaking process still remains.   
 The issue of fairness in our pluralist system has driven the majority of interest group 
research.  Generations of mobilization studies showed us that not all interests enjoy equal 
opportunities to be represented (Olson 1965; Salisbury 1969; Salisbury 1984; Walker 1991).  But 
even among groups that do participate in the process, inequalities persist.  Recent studies of 
interest groups to examine the effectiveness of lobbying (e.g., Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz 





1989; Stratmann 1995; Wawro 2001), and coalition formation (e.g., Heclo 1978; Sabatier and 
Weible 2007) have all been attempts to explain how inequalities still exist in the system.  There 
is compelling evidence organized business, beyond simply constituting the majority of group 
activities, also exercises greater influence in the system (Berry and Wilcox 2009, 177-185; 
Lindblom 1977; Mohoney 2007; Smith 2000).   
Substantive Contribution  
This study adds to the existing literature on interest groups and inequality in the policy 
process in two ways.  First, it attempts to determine how and if a bias exists in favor of particular 
interests at the congressional level.  More specifically, it attempts to answer the questions: What 
types of groups are satisfied with Congress?  And under what conditions are groups satisfied?  
To answer these questions, I developed measures of legislative satisfaction for nonprofit, 
membership association interest groups.  The population consisted of scorecard-issuing groups 
from the 106
th
 through the 111
th
 U.S. Senates.  This 12-year period (from 1999 to 2010) allowed 
me compare levels of satisfaction under exactly three terms of Republican control of the Senate 
and three terms of Democratic control.  I additionally attempted to determine if there is a 
relationship between an organization’s lobbying, electioneering, wealth, and membership and the 
group’s satisfaction with legislators.  I also tested whether organizations representing wealthy, 
niche populations are any more satisfied.   
The findings of my study lend support to the argument that groups organized around 
business causes tend to get what they want from the policy process.  For five out of the six terms 
of the U.S. Senate examined, business groups produced high levels of satisfaction with senators.  
It is only during the large Democratic majority of the 111
th
 Senate that business satisfaction 





majorities in the Senate.  These findings support similar studies to suggest that business interests 
are more successful at lobbying for their policies (e.g., Mohoney 2007), but they also reinforce 
the point that business and labor approach legislative politics differently.  Labor unions PACs 
overwhelmingly give to Democrats (McKay 2010).  On the other hand, business-affiliated PACs 
usually favor Republicans, but not by overwhelming margins (Berry and Wilcox 2009; McKay 
2010).  The conventional narrative has always been that Republicans are friends of organized 
business while Democrats are friends of labor.  The findings of this dissertation indicate that 
Democrats are also friends of organized business, or are at least close acquaintances. 
Public interest nonprofits consistently show the lowest levels of satisfaction no matter 
who is in charge of the Senate.  This was a mostly expected finding, as many of the highly 
ideological public interest groups (e.g., American Conservative Union and Americans for 
Democratic Action) would cancel either out.   
No studies have examined the relationship between charitable-mission organizations and 
congressional policy.  The findings of my repeated-measures ANOVAs indicate that charitable 
groups are generally more satisfied with Democratic control.  However, as noted in the previous 
chapter, charitable satisfaction enigmatically drops during the large Democratic majority of 
111
th
.  This finding was not expected, and there is certainly nothing to explain it in prior 
literature.  There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that charitable groups may have expected more 
from the 111
th
, when Democrats held large majorities in both houses of Congress. The 
Children’s Defense Fund, for example, expressed disappointment that the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act did not provide more support for the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(Meyerson 2009).  Moderate Democrats such as Blanche Lincoln and Mark Pryor had points 





organization) ratings for not supporting the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
(HCERA) of 2010.
105
  Many charitable and social welfare organizations supported the HCERA 
for expanding additional health care benefits for low-income individuals and increasing Pell 
Grant scholarship eligibility (Clark 2010; Hossain 2010).   
This study provides a unique perspective on the study of political activities.  Prior studies 
have examined lobbying and electioneering at a micro level attempting to answer questions such 
as, “Do PAC contributions affect legislative behavior?”  This study makes no attempt to isolate 
individual lobbyist-senator contacts or control exogenous factors that may influence votes.  
Instead, it examines political activities at a macro level by comparing aggregated spending on 
lobbying and electioneering to groups’ overall satisfaction with legislators.  Not surprisingly, the 
analysis presented here indicates there is little, if any, relationship between spending on lobbying 
and electioneering and legislative satisfaction at the macro level.   
As stated in the previous chapter, these findings should not be taken as evidence that 
these activities have no effect on congressional policymaking.  Most of the ratings used to create 
measures for this study were derived from groups counting roll-call votes and cosponsorships.  
In other words, groups evaluated senators based on their positions on bills that were highly 
developed or, in many cases, finalized.  Bills go through many iterations before they can reach 
the roll-call stage.  While a group may strongly oppose a bill up for a floor vote, a lobbying 
campaign during the bill’s development may have resulted in modifying the bill more to the 
organization’s liking.  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) strongly opposed passage of 
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the PATRIOT Act, for example.  But the group’s lobbying was successful at removing a 
provision that called for an indefinite suspension of habeas corpus (Brill 2003, 73-74).  
Inversely, a group’s ratings would be low if the bills it supported were overwhelmingly voted 
down.  However, the group’s lobbying campaign may have helped its supported legislation make 
it to the roll-call vote stage in the first place. 
It is also important to remember that not all legislation will be equally supported and 
opposed by groups.  While some groups weight the votes they follow to indicate which bills are 
most strongly supported or opposed, most do not.  Even for those groups that do weight votes, 
their weighting systems on many occasions will be unable to reflect the differences between 
typical legislation and bills that can fundamentally affect an interest group positively or 
negatively.  As stated in chapter 2, Baumgartner and his colleagues (2009) found that while most 
lobbying campaigns are not successful, those that are successful are usually able to achieve 
major changes to a policy area.  Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz’s (2009) rate of investment on 
lobbying measure found that businesses saved $220 for every $1 they spent on lobbying in favor 
of the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004.  Groups such as the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce that included AJCA on their scorecards surely included votes on other bills, too.
106
  
While many legislators may have voted against the Chamber on those other bills, it is unlikely 
those other bills would have affected the organization’s business members as greatly as the 
AJCA did.   
 Specific to electioneering, this study adds to the existing literature in a number of ways.  
Most past electioneering influence studies have examined whether PAC contributions affect 
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legislative decisions (e.g., Grenzke 1989; Fleisher 1993; Stratmann 1995; Wawro 2001; Wright 
1990; Wright 1996). Few if any have attempted to determine if hard-money independent 
expenditures or 527 expenditures affect congressional policy, as this one does.  Most 
importantly, virtually all electioneering studies have examined campaign activities from the 
influence perspective.  In other words, scholars have attempted to determine if campaign 
activities can cause legislators to behave in a desired way.  If an interest group is able to elect a 
large slate of likeminded candidates, however, there is no need to try and change those 
legislators’ opinions when important legislation is debated.  This study examines electioneering 
from the indirect perspective by determining whether groups that spend more on elections are 
any more satisfied with legislators in the next congressional session.  Similar to the lobbying 
conclusion, this study finds that groups that spend more, at the aggregate, on campaigns are not 
any more satisfied on the whole with legislators in the next session.   
 As with the lobbying findings, one should not assume from this conclusion that a group’s 
campaign activities do not at all contribute to more favorable policy outputs.  As many scholars 
have noted, groups often use campaign contributions and lobbying in conjunction (Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998; Hoinacki and Kimball 1998; McKay 2010).  In such cases, contributing to 
incumbent legislators can help maintain access to favorable legislators (Langbein 1986).  One 
must also remember that campaign outcomes are usually influenced by larger factors, such as the 
economy, that have little to do with interest group campaign activities (Erikson 1989; Jacobson 
1990).  If larger forces outside of the group’s control are destined to produce an unfavorable 
outcome, then the group will be unsatisfied with the next session’s legislators no matter how 





Finally, this study found, also largely as expected, that a group’s overall wealth and 
membership is not a predictor of the organization’s satisfaction with legislators.  While some 
scholars have argued that labor unions and public interest groups with large membership can 
overcome the business community’s resource advantages with the “power of people” (Berry 
1997, 233), the findings of Baumgartner and his colleagues (2009) and this study would suggest 
otherwise.  Similar studies have found that large memberships for labor unions and public 
interest groups are also not positive predictors of influence during administrative policy making 
either (Furlong 1997).  It seems that having millions of members alone is not enough to produce 
favorable legislation.  That said, there is some evidence that a large membership may work in 
conjunction with lobbying and campaign tactics to produce legislative influence.  Smith (1993), 
for example, notes that lobbying and PAC contributions can be effective at influencing 
legislators when a group has many active members in the legislator’s district.   
This study, of course, does not examine membership from the state or district level.  
Instead, my membership variable (based on an average of membership and circulation of the 
group’s major publications) is a measure for the group’s appeal nationally.  But even in such 
cases where membership is tested at this district level, the actual impact of having a large 
membership on influencing legislators remains questionable.  In cases where a group has a large 
membership in the legislator’s home district, it is possible the legislator’s voting record is not 
due to an interest group’s large membership “convincing” the member of Congress to vote a 
certain way.  Instead, maybe the interest group’s membership prevented a legislator with 
opposing views from becoming a member of Congress in the first place.  It is hard to imagine, 





2009 auto bailout being elected to a Detroit congressional seat in 2008 (when the bailout was 
first discussed).   
Having a great deal of money, like a large membership, also seems to be unrelated to a 
group’s legislative satisfaction.  Wealth is a surprisingly little studied variable in the literature on 
interest group success in public policy.  The explanation of why may partly have to do with 
confusion over what actually constitutes wealth.  Many scholars sought to measure “resources” 
in terms of how much groups spend on lobbying and in PAC contributions (e.g., Schattschneider 
1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).  There are many organizations, however, that maintain 
large amounts of organizational wealth but do not spend their money on traditional political 
activities such as lobbying and electioneering.  This study finds that organizations with lots of 
money, regardless of whether they spend it on political activities, are not any more satisfied with 
legislative policy.  
Finally, this study also concludes that groups representing wealthy policy niche 
populations are no more satisfied with legislative policy than other groups.  As stated in the 
previous chapter, this is somewhat of a surprise and runs contrary to prior academic literature.  
Still, as mentioned before, the findings within this study may have more to do with the 
operationalization of the concept “niche” populations.  This study uses a proxy measure by 
dividing the wealth of an organization by its membership to account for whether groups 
represent niche populations.  Prior studies on this topic have defined niche interest organizations 
using the issues on which groups work as their variables (e.g., Brown 1990; Gray and Lowery 
1996; Baumgartner and Leech 2001).  For example, Baumgartner and Leech (2001), the most 





5 percent of issues accounted for 45 percent of lobbying activities while some issues where 
lobbied on by only one or two “niche” groups.    
I lack data indicating what the majority of groups used to create their scorecards.  Thus, I 
cannot define niche organizations by identifying groups that rate legislators on bills not included 
on other scorecards.  Furthermore, simply being included on only one or two scorecards is not 
necessarily an indication of issue’s “nicheness,” as many for-profit businesses and groups that do 
not issue scorecards may have lobbied in favor or opposition of the bill.   
There are certainly many other factors that could affect an organization’s satisfaction 
with legislative policy that are not included in this study.  Exogenous shocks, for example, can 
lead to sustainable changes in policy areas (Sabatier and Weible 2007; Stone 1989).  One could 
easily use aggregated ratings to track satisfaction in response to exogenous factors.  How 
differently did the ACLU evaluate legislators post September 11, 2001, for example?   
Additionally, it should be noted that this dissertation is limited to studying interest group 
satisfaction at the adoption stage.  The fact that interest groups are evaluating legislators 
primarily on their positions roll call votes and cosponsorships means that this study largely 
ignores interest group satisfaction with the agenda setting process.  Prior scholars have noted the 
ability of powerful groups, especially organized business, to shape policy making agendas (e.g., 
Lindblom 1977; Bachrach and Baratz 1962).  Therefore, many of the ratings used to generate the 
measures of legislative satisfaction in this study likely contain some bias in favor of organized 
business, as bill that were extremely objectionable to big business may not have made it to the 





Methodological Contribution  
 It could be argued that the greater contribution of this dissertation is its new approach to 
the study of interest groups.  As discussed in chapter one, interest group research has produced 
few generalizable findings in comparison to the studies of Congress, the presidency, bureaucratic 
agencies, or political parties (Berry 1994).  The primary explanation for the lack of such findings 
is a deficiency in quality data (Arnold 1982, 101; Cigler 1994; Berry 1994, 21-22; Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998, 4-5).  Interest groups are private institutions, unlike legislatures and government 
agencies.  They are much less regulated than political parties and are not subject to as many 
disclosure requirements (Herszenhorn 2010; Schattschneider 1960).  Thus, there are few 
institutionally supported sources of data for the study of interest groups outside of PAC 
contributions.  Nowhere has the lack of data created more of a void in our scholarly collective 
knowledge than within the study of interest groups and policy success.  While scholars have 
successfully studied the internal workings of groups and successfully challenged the pluralist 
assumption that all potential interests enjoy the opportunity to mobilize (e.g., Olson 1965; 
Salisbury 1969; Wilson 1973; Moe 1980a; Moe 1980b; Walker 1983; Salisbury 1984), they have 
made little progress in determining if some groups are any more likely to get what they want 
(Ainsworth 2002, 1-8; Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 13; Mahoney 2007, 35).   
 Scorecards are an easily accessible source of data that may finally allow researchers to 
explore questions of inequality in the “pluralist heaven” of American politics (Schattschneider 
1960).  Using legislator ratings as a means of making inferences about interest groups as opposed 
to members of Congress holds many advantages over the primary data-collection methods of 
prior similar studies (e.g., Baumgartner, et. al. 2009; Mahoney 2007; Rees 1999).  By 





important issues for interest groups and whether legislators agreed with the group on certain 
issues.  During a relatively short period of time, this study was able to analyze a large population 
of groups and follow their policy preferences over a larger period of time than similar studies 
requiring substantially more resources (e.g., Baumgartner, et. al. 2009; Rees 1999).   
 This study aggregates legislator ratings to examine interest group legislative satisfaction, 
but the use of aggargated scorecards should not be limited simply to this.  The ultimate goal for 
policy inequality studies such as this one is to move toward the study of power with the ability to 
make generalizations regarding what types of groups exercise influence over legislators.  There 
is little reason to believe scorecards could not serve as a substitute for surveys and interviews in 
future studies on interest group influence.   
 Of course, there are numerous other possibilities for the use of scorecards beyond 
examining how successful groups are in the policy process.  The standard deviation portion of 
this study (in Chapter V) is but one example of the many other ways scorecards can be used to 
produce additional generalizations about interest groups.  One could easily reverse the causal 
assumption of the regression models in the previous chapter to determine if legislative 
satisfaction predicts political activities in the following Congress or election cycle.  Additionally, 
one could explore the relationship between a group’s congressional ratings and the internal 
workings of groups.  For example, does an increase in partisanship (larger standard deviations in 
scorecards) predict an increase in the membership size of public interest organizations?   
 Obviously, no one tool will allow scholars to answer every question involving interest 
groups in the policy process.  There will always be a need for primary data collection, as there 
remains with even more data-rich topics such as Congress, the presidency, and elections.  Yet, 





measures of legislator ideology and preference has left their potential largely untapped.  As the 
interest group population has increased in the last 20 years (Berry and Wilcox 2009, 15-20), 
more groups have relied on the Internet as a means of reaching their target audience and 
educating the public (ibid., 49 and 118-120).  Technological advances that have allowed 
organizations to more easily and cheaply disseminate their messages are also the most likely 
explanation for why scorecards have become increasingly popular educational tools for groups in 
the last couple of decades.  Scorecards used by scholars from the 1960s through the early 1990s 
(during the heyday for scorecard research) were printed on brochures or published in newsletters 
and mailed to members at the end of the year or the term of Congress.  The Internet allows 
groups to create scorecards in real time and distribute them instantaneously to millions at a 
fraction of the cost of scorecards created 20 years ago.  With so many questions involving 
interest groups and congressional policy yet to be answered, scholars would be well served to 
revisit these tools that have largely been “relegated to the dustbins of political science history” 
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